Privacy 3.0-The Principle of Proportionality by Serwin, Andrew B.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 42
2009 
Privacy 3.0-The Principle of Proportionality 
Andrew B. Serwin 
Foley & Lardner LLP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Common Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science 
and Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew B. Serwin, Privacy 3.0-The Principle of Proportionality, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 869 (2009). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol42/iss4/5 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
PRIVACY 3.0-THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
Andrew B. Serwin*
Individual concern over privacy has existed as long as humans have said or done
things they do not wish others to know about. In their groundbreaking law review
article The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis posited that the common law
should protect an individual's right to privacy under a right formulated as the
right to be let alone-Privacy 1.0. As technology advanced and societal values
also changed, a belief surfaced that the Warren and Brandeis formulation did not
provide sufficient structure for the development of privacy laws. As such, a second
theoretical construct of privacy, Privacy 2.0 as expressed in Dean Prosser's work
Privacy was created. Dean Prosser continued (or expanded) upon the concepts
formulated by Warren and Brandeis, particularly in emphasizing the role of com-
mon law in protecting privacy.
These works, while influential in their time, do not account for paradigm shifts in
technology, or, perhaps more importantly, changes in how people live their lives.
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section of the ABA Model Web Site: A Knowledge Management Approach to E-Business
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The unending advance of technology and changes in societal norms fundamen-
tally dictate that privacy theory must change over time, or it will lose its relevance.
Indeed, in today ' Web 2.0 world where many people instantly share very private
aspects of their lives, one can hardly imagine a privacy concept more foreign than
the right to be let alone.
The question confronting modern-day privacy scholars is this: Can a common law
based theory adequately address the shifting societal norms and rapid technologi-
cal changes of today's Web 2.0 world where legislatures and government agencies,
not courts, are more proactive on privacy protections?
This Article argues that the answer is no and instead argues that the overarching
principle of privacy of today should not be the right to be let alone, but rather the
principle of proportionality. This is Privacy 3. 0.
INTRODUCTION
Individual concern over privacy has existed for as long as hu-
mans have said or done things they do not wish others to know
about. While societies have had different formulations of privacy,
largely based upon factors such as cultural values, societal need,
and technology, privacy remains an age old issue.
Indeed, some of the earliest privacy restrictions were on "eaves-
dropping." While we now conceptualize this issue as an electronic
communication concern, before telephones existed people were
concerned about others listening at the eaves of their houses. This
concern changed as technology evolved in the late 1800s, and the
law attempted to react to new technology. In their groundbreaking
law review article, The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis posited
that the law, specifically the common law, should protect an indi-
vidual's right to privacy. This law review article was in large part
driven by a technological advance that created quite a stir, particu-
larly in light of the media practices of the day-the instant camera.
If the instant camera gave them pause, one wonders what they
would think of a world defined by Facebook and Flickr.1
While Warren and Brandeis are often credited with creating the
right of privacy, they certainly did not do so.2 What they did do,
however, is provide the theoretical construct that helped shape the
parameters of privacy protection in the United States. Ultimately,
1. For the non-Web 2.0 readers, Facebook is the leading online social networking site
and Flickr is an Internet service that permits one to upload, tag and share photographs.
2. For a detailed discussion of the origins and the substantial body of privacy law that
predated Warren's and Brandeis's article, see Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's
Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEo. L.J. 123 (2007).
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while serving on the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis had the op-
portunity to address another privacy issue raised by changes in
technology-specifically whether there was a constitutional prohi-
bition on wiretapping and the use of pen registers on telephones.
While many now feel that government should have no right to
wiretap citizens without a warrant, the Supreme Court initially
found that, since a third-party's facilities (the phone company's)
were inherently part of the communication, no right of privacy ex-
isted in relation to telephone calls . Ironically, it was the dissent by
Justice Brandeis in this case and his reiteration of the core right
articulated in the Warren and Brandeis article that perhaps best
illustrates the first theoretical construct of privacy-the concept
that individuals had the "right to be let alone"-Privacy 1.0.
4
With the passage of time, courts adopted this right and used the
common law to enforce it. Moreover, as technology continued to
advance and societal values changed, a belief surfaced that the
Warren and Brandeis formulation did not provide sufficient struc-
ture for the development of privacy laws.5 As such, a second
theoretical construct of privacy, Privacy 2.0, as expressed in Dean
Prosser's work Privacy, was created and ultimately captured in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Dean Prosser continued (or expanded)
upon the concepts formulated by Warren and Brandeis, particu-
larly in emphasizing the role of common law in protecting privacy.
Dean Prosser analyzed the flood of cases that flowed from the War-
ren and Brandeis article and categorized the privacy protections
created by the common law into four distinct acts that were found
to be violations of an individual's right of privacy. While important,
Prosser's theory is limited because its basis, like that of Privacy 1.0,
stems from common law and tort.
These works, while influential in their time, do not account for
changes in values, paradigm shifts in technology, and, perhaps
more importantly, changes in how people live their lives. The un-
ending advance of technology and changes in societal norms
fundamentally dictate that privacy theory and its associated con-
cepts must change over time or they will lose their relevance.
A privacy issue that looms on the horizon, health care record in-
teroperability, provides a perfect example of changes in technology
effecting societal norms regarding privacy. Many states are mandat-
ing health care entities that receive state funds to become
3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
4. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 I-ARv. L. REv. 193
(1890).
5. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. Rv. 383 (1960).
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compliant with systems that permit the sharing of medical informa-
tion electronically by 2014.6 While setting the technological
standards is a difficult task, setting the standards for privacy and
security will present even more complex challenges. In the time of
Warren and Brandeis, a "right to be let alone" was a viable theo-
retical construct.7 In today's society, information sharing is here to
stay and privacy theory must adjust to meet this challenge. Indeed,
in today's Web 2.0 world, where many people instantly share very
private aspects of their lives, one can hardly imagine a privacy con-
cept more foreign than the right to be let alone."
This is a point that can hardly be debated, since many modern
scholars recognize that the prior theoretical constructs of privacy
have not met the needs of individuals.9 Despite the proliferation of
privacy laws in the United States, more and more people feel they
have less protection for their personal information. ° That the
6. On February 17, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 (2009) ("ARRA") (commonly
referred to as the Federal Stimulus Package). The ARRA contained the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act's ("HITECH Act") provisions within it.
The ARRA provides for substantial stimulus expenditures in the health care industry, par-
ticular for the adoption of electronic health records ("EHR") technology. The largest
allocation of healthcare information technology ("HIT") related funding-approximately
$16 billion-is for incentives through the Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement systems to
incentivize providers and hospitals to implement EHR systems.
7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 205.
8. This is not to say that everyone shares these values or wants instant information
sharing, but that truly is the point of Privacy 3.0, the principle of proportionality, advocated
by this Article. While Privacy 3.0 has the flexibility to account for different viewpoints on the
sharing of sensitive information, a theoretical construct as absolute as the "right to be let
alone" does not have the same level of flexibility. While one can argue that an individual can
choose or not choose to be let alone, today's society functions on information sharing that
many people take for granted. If one questions this premise, one need simply ask how many
consumers have voluntarily placed a security freeze on their credit report when they have no
reason to fear identity theft. While some may have done so, the vast majority have not, de-
spite the availability of the right, because there is a societal benefit-readily available
credit-that they enjoy as a result. Thus, we must recognize that absolute principles are not
the appropriate model for information privacy in the United States.
9. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis's Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS
L.J. 643 (2007); Richards & Solove, supra note 2.
10. Indeed, Dean Chemerinsky recently noted that informational privacy:
[I]s the area of privacy law that is in the most dramatic need of development. There
needs to be judicial protection of a constitutional right to informational privacy and
greater safeguards through tort law and statutes. The Supreme Court needs to recog-
nize a fundamental right to informational privacy under the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Tort law and statutes must do a better job of
providing for liability for those who reveal deeply personal information about indi-
viduals. This is the unfinished legacy of Warren and Brandeis, and now, more than
ever, it needs to be realized.
Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 656-57.
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European Union (EU) found that United States' law failed to ade-
quately protect individuals' privacy, and therefore banned the
export of information regarding EU residents to the United States,
only further illustrates this point."
Some modern scholars characterize the issue as the need to con-
tinue the path of Warren and Brandeis, and have called on the
courts to step in and constitutionally protect informational pri-
vacy. 2 Other modern scholars have begun to question the path of
Privacy 1.0 and 2.0 because both rest upon a theory of "inviolate
personality."" These scholars have contrasted the Warren and
Brandeis theoretical formulation of privacy with other common
law decisions from England that rely upon a different theory-one
based upon confidentiality-and posit that Warren and Brandeis
followed the wrong path and instead should have used the confi-
dentiality cases as their theoretical foundation.
This Article argues that questioning the assumptions of prior
privacy theory is correct and indeed necessary at this time, but the
questions that must be raised should not result in further use of
theories that rely upon the common law. Indeed, further reliance
upon common law, whether based upon "inviolate personality" or
confidentiality, is not the correct solution and will not solve the
underlying issue with common law based theories because of the
inherent limitations of tort law in the privacy context. Indeed,
when they are assessing constitutional rights of individuals regard-
ing the disclosure of information, many courts are starting to
recognize and reject the concept of "confidentiality" and examine
whether information is "sensitive," thus not considering whether
the information is "public" or "private.'
5
11. In order to export most forms of data from the EU to the United States, compa-
nies must follow additional steps, including entering model contracts, complying with the
safe harbor principles, or enacting Binding Corporate Rules. For a complete discussion of
these concepts, see ANDREW SERWIN, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. West 2008).
12. Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 644.
13. Richards & Solove, supra note 2, at 127-30.
14. Richards & Solove, supra note 2, at 131-32.
15. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 410 (N.J. 1995) ("[P]rivacy interests may be impli-
cated where disclosure of a person's address results in unsolicited contact .... We find,
moreover, that considering the totality of the information disclosed to the public, the Notifi-
cation Law implicates a privacy interest. That the information disseminated under the
Notification Law may be available to the public, in some form or other, does not mean that
plaintiff has no interest in limiting its dissemination."); Burnett v. County Of Bergen, 954
A.2d 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (holding that disclosure of Social Security numbers
violated the New Jersey state constitution even though Social Security numbers are fre-
quently public), affrd in part and rev'd in part, 968 A.2d 1151 (NJ. 2009).
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The question confronting modern-day privacy scholars is this- Can a
common law based theory adequately address the shifting societal
norms and rapid technological changes of today's Web 2.0 world
where legislatures and government agencies, not courts, are more
proactive on privacy protections?
This Article argues that the answer is no and instead argues that
the common law based prior scholarship was relevant for its day,
but it cannot account for the technology and societal values of to-
day, our statutorily-driven privacy protections, and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement centric model, and should
therefore not provide the theoretical construct for existing or fu-
ture laws or court decisions. This is all the more true in light of recent
FTC guidance regarding behavioral advertising, in which the FTC expressly
recognized the need to balance support for innovation and consumer protec-
tion, as well as the "benefits" provided to consumers by behavioral
advertising.
16
The experience of the last one hundred years, including the
questions being raised today about the viability of prior theoretical
constructs of privacy, demonstrates that common law theories that
rely upon courts to drive doctrine are not the appropriate model
where legislatures are more active in protecting privacy via statutes,
and government enforcement mechanisms other than courts, par-
ticularly the FTC, are more likely to impact information privacy
practices. But common law based theories face additional hurdles
as well. Both Warren and Brandeis, as well as Prosser, explicitly rely
upon tort enforcement for privacy violations." However, a model
that relies upon tort enforcement is doomed to inconsistent results
because relying upon tort enforcement ignores the reality that
many privacy breaches that should give rise to a remedy of some
sort, particularly in the case of truly sensitive information, do not
because there is no "damage" suffered by the individual as a result
of the breach. As discussed below, this has been an issue for courts
and will continue to be one as long as we rely upon common law
models.
Moreover, reliance upon common law theories, even where the
underlying theory is confidentiality, is not a viable option in today's
16. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING MOVING THE
DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES (2007) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/
P859900stmt.pdf.
17. Warren and Brandeis explicitly state that tort enforcement is the appropriate
mechanism to enforce privacy Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 219, as does Prosser,
which is demonstrated by the adoption of his four categories of privacy violations into the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1976).
[VOL. 42:4
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society because information sharing is core to our culture and so-
ciety and confidentiality as a theoretical construct is as limited as
other common law based theories. Thus, a theoretical construct
based upon the common law, particularly one that was created
prior to the technological advances of today, provides little insight
in the Web 2.0 world.
We find ourselves today in a situation where we have more pri-
vacy regulation than ever, yet we lack a relevant and cohesive
theory of privacy. This failure leads to situations where individuals
feel their privacy is not being protected and people or entities that
hold or process others' data do not have clear guidance on proper
information practices. As long as we rely on common law theories,
no matter how many laws are passed, this will not change. 8 All a
common law based model will ensure is that, in many cases, these
laws will impose inconsistent burdens on information that will not
meet society's need for privacy.19
Given the changes in society, as well as the enforcement mecha-
nisms that exist today, particularly given the FTC's new focus on
"unfairness," and the well-recognized need to balance regulation
and innovation, a different theoretical construct must be created-
one that cannot be based upon precluding information sharing via
common law methods. Instead, the overarching principle of pri-
vacy of today should not be the right to be let alone, but rather the
principle of proportionality. This is Privacy 3.0.
The principle of proportionality recognizes that neither the
government nor private citizens benefit. (and in fact they have
much to lose) from overbroad privacy restrictions.0 For instance,
overbroad privacy restrictions could jeopardize someone's life if
the sharing of medical information is hindered in an emergency
18. The pretexting issues that recently became news are a good example of this prob-
lem. While, historically, telephone connection records have not been entitled to extreme
protections, public perception obviously was not in line with Supreme Court holdings and
there were those that believed that the practice of obtaining telephone records under false
pretenses was already a crime and California's attorney general attempted to prosecute indi-
viduals for their alleged conduct. Simultaneously, many legislatures, including California,
passed anti-pretexting laws to prohibit the conduct that purportedly was already criminal. In
the end, a number of states passed anti-pretexting laws, the Federal Communications Com-
mission enacted a number of new regulations, and the charges were ultimately dropped.
The principle and tiered system advocated by this Article would provide more clarity than
existing theories because, once information is identified and placed in a tier, individuals and
entities dealing with data will have a clearer picture of appropriate conduct and protections.
See SERWIN, supra note 11, at chs. 5-6, 14 (discussing the law of pretexting and wiretapping).
19. For a detailed treatment of privacy law, see SERWIN, supra note 11.
20. As noted below, this concept is implicit in the FrC's formulation of what is an "un-
fair" business practice, which is a now a privacy and security enforcement theory. See infra
Part V.
Privacy 3. 0
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situation. Other examples include purchasing necessary goods
based upon easily available credit and finding people with the
same interests via a social networking site. This is not to say that
information should be freely available and access should be
granted to any petty thief who seeks to do harm. Instead, a theory
of proportional protection places higher restrictions and access
barriers on truly sensitive information that either has limited or no
use to third-parties and has great capacity to damage individuals
and society, while simultaneously permitting the necessary and ap-
propriate access to those having a legitimate need to know certain
information, particularly when that information is less sensitive.
Proportionality also has the advantage of minimizing the societal
impact of privacy issues because enforcement and compliance will
be focused on the most appropriate levels of sensitive information.
While the principle alone provides some guidance, it is the ap-
plication of the principle of proportionality to create four tiers of
information that is the most important aspect of this theory of pri-
vacy. The four tiers will provide guidance on existing issues,
attempt to bring cohesion to the numerous state and federal laws,
and provide guidance for new issues and data types once they are
characterized as falling within one of the tiers. Using pretexting as
an example, once telephone records are placed in their appropri-
ate category, understanding what conduct is appropriate and
whether there is a specific law in place precluding the practice be-
comes a much simpler and clearer task. More importantly, while
the tiers provide much needed structure, the principle of propor-
tionality ensures that the theoretical construct can easily deal with
changes in technology. Using connection records (the subject of
pretexting) as an example, as more new methods of communica-
tion are created, by using the predictive nature of the tier
methodology, one can attempt to predict how legislatures and
courts will treat records related to new forms of communication
even before laws are in place.
The proportionality framework could also address more easily
the changes in societal norms and values. As we have seen from the
meteoric rise of the Internet and related technologies, new tech-
nology both generates new privacy concerns (through the creation
of new forms of sensitive data) and renders certain privacy con-
cerns related to older technology (that is no longer used) less
relevant. Once data becomes less important or relevant (think of
the relative unimportance of the PIN for your ATM if banks started
using biometric data as an authenticator), the information be-
comes less sensitive. The principle of proportionality, with its focus
[VOL. 42:4
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on the level of sensitivity of information, can accommodate those
changes in a way that other models cannot.
The need for a meaningful and relevant theoretical construct
for privacy cannot be overstated. Statutes and case law ultimately
set the standards for conduct and provide guidance after they are
enacted or decided. However, setting up a theoretical construct a
priori such that it could be used proactively by legislators and
courts when confronting privacy issues will help minimize inconsis-
tent requirements that either are too restrictive (therefore creating
economic and other barriers for society) or not restrictive enough
to protect privacy.
One issue should be noted before the matrixed model is exam-
ined. While in theory the model could be based upon a
continuum, the use of a matrixed approach would cause the model
to lose some of its predictive ability. The loss of predictive ability
would result from the inability to group similar types of informa-
tion into tiers and it is this grouping that lets individuals more
accurately predict how new forms of information will be treated.
1. PRIVACY 1.0-A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While privacy was not invented by Warren and Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy was, and remains, the defining moment for privacy
in the United States. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that
their privacy theory was the foundation for privacy law in the
United States, hence Privacy 1.0.21
Warren and Brandeis were deeply concerned about the inability
of the common law to protect an individual's privacy, particularly at
a time of technological advances:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advanc-
ing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from
the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture,
has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modem enterprise and invention have, through invasions
upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress,
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.2
21. Prosser, supra note 5, at 423.
22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 196.
Pivacy 3. 0
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The technological advance that caused the most concern was the
23instant camera.
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the per-
son, and for securing to the individual whatJudge Cooley calls
the right "to be let alone". Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that "what is whispered
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." ... Of
the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of some such pro-
tection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press is
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propri-
ety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the
idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pur-
sued with industry as well as effrontery.1
4
While the problem was clearly identified by Warren and
Brandeis, finding a legal theory that provided adequate protection
proved more difficult. 5 They first considered the law of defamation
as a model for invasions of privacy:
Owing to the nature of the instruments by which privacy is in-
vaded, the injury inflicted bears a superficial resemblance to
the wrongs dealt with by the law of slander and of libel, while
a legal remedy for such injury seems to involve the treatment
26of mere wounded feelings, as a substantive cause of action.
However, the law of defamation was ultimately rejected because it
was based upon a "radically different class" of damages to an indi-
vidual.27 This was in part because, if the action was otherwise lawful,
23. This technological advance coincided with a paradigm shift in society-the in-
creasing role of the media and, in particular, newspaper circulation. According to the
research of Richards and Solove, the growth of the predominant media outlet of the time-
newspapers-was astounding. In the forty-year period between 1850 and 1890 the number
of newspapers grew from one-hundred to nine-hundred, with a corresponding increase in
readers. Newspaper readers went from approximately 800,000 to more than 8 million peo-
ple. Richards & Solove, supra note 2, at 128.
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 195-96.
25. "It is our purpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle which
can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the
nature and extent of such protection is." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 197.
26. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 197.
27. "The principle on which the law of defamation rests, covers, however, a radically
different class of effects from those for which attention is now asked .... [T]he wrongs and
[VOL. 42:4
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common law, unlike Roman law, did not recognize a claim for
mere mental injury.8
Warren and Brandeis then considered whether principles of
contracts could be applied to protect privacy, noting that there was
some basis in prior case law to conclude that they could.
It should be stated that, in some instances where protection
has been afforded against wrongful publication, the jurisdic-
tion has been asserted, not on the ground of property, or at
least not wholly on that ground, but upon the ground of an
alleged breach of an implied contract or of a trust or confi-
dence.29
Despite this observation, they ultimately rejected this theory, find-
ing that a contractual theory was too narrow to address the privacy
harms of the day. °
Warren and Brandeis then concluded that the extension of
common law could address privacy concerns. They noted that
"[t]he common law secures to each individual the right of
correlative rights recognized by the law of slander and libel are in their nature material
rather than spiritual." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 197.
28. Warren & Brandeis note that:
Injury of feelings may indeed be taken account of in ascertaining the amount of
damages when attending what is recognized as a legal injury; but our system, unlike
the Roman law, does not afford a remedy even for mental suffering which results
from mere contumely and insult, but from an intentional and unwarranted violation
of the "honor" of another.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 197-98.
29. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 207.
30. Warren & Brandeis note that:
This process of implying a term in a contract, or of implying a trust (particularly
where a contract is written, and where these is no established usage or custom), is
nothing more nor less than ajudicial declaration that public morality, private justice,
and general convenience demand the recognition of such a rule, and that the publi-
cation under similar circumstances would be considered an intolerable abuse. So
long as these circumstances happen to present a contract upon which such a term
can be engrafted by the judicial mind, or to supply relations upon which a trust or
confidence can be erected, there may be no objection to working out the desired
protection though the doctrines of contract or of trust. But the court can hardly stop
there. The narrower doctrine may have satisfied the demands of society at a time
when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have arisen without violating a
contract or a special confidence; but now that modem devices afford abundant op-
portunities for the perpetration of such wrongs without any participation by the
injured party, the protection granted by the law must be placed upon a broader
foundation.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 210-11.
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determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments,
and emotions shall be communicated to others. 3 1 This right was
seen as a broad right of privacy against an individual, irrespective
of privity of contract.32 This was based upon a belief in the "invio-
late personality," which was expressed in the oft-quoted
formulation of privacy of the time-the "right to be let alone."
3
While Brandeis receives credit for inventing this right, as noted
above, in fact Judge Thomas Cooley coined the phrase in a tort
treatise.34 Warren and Brandeis explicitly relied upon common law
theories, as well as common law enforcement. They saw actions for
tort damages as a critical part of the enforcement of the right of
• 35privacy.
Richards and Solove question the use of the right to be let alone
as a privacy concept. Judge Cooley originally used the concept in
the context of a plaintiff who had suffered an assault where no
physical contact occurred. 6 In modern parlance, this would be an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Given the fun-
damentally different nature of infliction of emotional distress
claims and informational privacy issues, the questions raised by
37Richards and Solove seem quite appropriate.
31. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 198.
32. Warren & Brandeis note that:
We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected, whatever their exact na-
ture, are not rights arising from contract or from special trust, but are rights as
against the world; and, as above stated, the principle which has been applied to pro-
tect these rights is in reality not the principle of private property, unless that word be
used in an extended and unusual sense. The principle which protects personal writ-
ings and any other productions of the intellect of or the emotions, is the right to
privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this protec-
tion to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relation, domestic or
otherwise.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 213.
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 205.
34. Richards & Solove, supra note 2, at 129-30.
35. Warren & Brandeis note that:
[T]he doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate to support the required pro-
tection, and the law of tort must be resorted to. The right of property in its widest
sense, including all possession, including all rights and privileges, and hence embrac-
ing the right to an inviolate personality, affords alone that broad basis upon which
the protection which the individual demands can be rested.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 211.
36. Richards & Solove, supra note 2, at 130.
37. Richards & Solove note that:
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The right to be let alone, despite being rooted in the law of as-
sault, and not privacy, became one of the enduring privacy
concepts." Not only did it appear in The Right to Privacy, it also ap
peared in one of Justice Brandeis's most famous dissents in the
Olmstead case:
[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.39
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the government. Discovery and invention
have made it possible for the government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet.
40
It should be noted that while Warren and Brandeis were the first to
offer a cohesive privacy theory, these concepts were certainly im-
plicit in the Bill of Rights, including in the Third and Fifth
Amendment, as well as the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on
government searches and seizures. Moreover, as Richards and So-
love correctly argue, there were a number of common law cases
that had already recognized a right of privacy, albeit based upon a
theory of confidentiality or confidential relations.4'
Warren and Brandeis certainly found useful Cooley's recognition of mental injury as
a basis for tort recovery, but Cooley's usage of "the right to be let alone" was fleeting
and had no connection to privacy rights. By contrast, Cooley devoted an entire chap-
ter of the same treatise to the law of "confidential relations," but Warren and
Brandeis did not discuss it.
Richards & Solove, supra note 2, at 130.
38. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 205.
39. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 473.
41. Richards & Solove note that:
The law of confidential relations applied to specific relationships such as those enu-
merated by Cooley in his treatise. Nevertheless, this list was insufficient to protect
instances of disclosure of confidential information in other relationships. In this con-
text, English courts of equity filled the gap by fashioning an action for breach of
confidence that could apply even where there was no attorney-client relationship or
other "direct confidential relation," such as the disclosure of personal or trade se-
crets. Legal remedies for divulging such confidential information began to emerge as
early as the eighteenth century.
Richards & Solove, supra note 2, at 136.
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While Warren and Brandeis's article was hailed and treated as
the theoretical construct for privacy for over one hundred years,
recently modern scholars have begun to question its continuing
viability. Richards and Solove, relying upon English common law,
argue that Warren and Brandeis should have followed a different
path-one that rests on claims arising out of a "breach of confi-
dence," instead of relying, as noted above, on one that protects an
"inviolate personality" from harm.
Moreover, ironically, given that the technological driver of War-
ren's and Brandeis's article was instant photography, a recent law
review called for additional federal legislation to address the tag-
ging and dissemination of photographs on the Internet, finding
that traditional privacy laws, particularly tort-based theories, were
not adequate to address this issue.43 While not directly questioning
the Warren and Brandeis model, it is notable that the very issue
that Warren and Brandeis wrote about still defies current privacy
theory.
II. PRIVACY 2.o-A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While groundbreaking, Privacy 1.0 did not provide all of the
structure needed by courts, particularly as technology advanced
and concerns over privacy changed. Dean Prosser noted this dis-
connect in 1960:
42. Richards & Solove note that:
Warren and Brandeis did not expressly reject breach of confidentiality as a remedy
for invasions of privacy, but instead of developing this concept and line of cases, they
shifted to a different path. They explained the goal of privacy protections not as en-
forcing the norms and morality of relationships but as protecting an "inviolate
personality" and the feelings of the individual from injury.
Richards & Solove, supra note 2, at 133.
43. On this point, the law review noted that:
For several reasons, existing privacy law is simply ill-suited for this new invasion. First,
traditional tort law does not recognize invasions of privacy that occur in public, such
as the taking of a photo in any public location. Second, the few "public invasions"
that do constitute torts involve celebrities or other individuals who have commercial
interests in their likenesses. Third, courts have severely limited privacy protections in
order to ensure that privacy claims do not limit the free flow of ideas.
Note, In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Privacy Law, 120 HARv. L. REV.
1870, 1872 (2007).
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Judge Biggs has described the present state of the law of pri-
vacy as "still that of a haystack in a hurricane." Disarray there
certainly is; but almost all of the confusion is due to a failure
to separate and distinguish these four forms of invasions, and
to realize that they call for different things.4
Dean Prosser attempted to cure the disarray by creating the next
theoretical construct of privacy-Privacy 2.0-by following a closely
related path. In 1960, Dean Prosser examined a number of the
cases that flowed from the Warren and Brandeis theory and cate-
gorized them into one of four categories, which ultimately served
as the basis for the Restatement's four categories of privacy torts:
intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, pub-
licity given to private life, and publicity placing a person in false
light. While Dean Prosser's goal was a noble one, the current
commentary on privacy suggests that the hurricane is still blowing
quite strongly.
The Restatement formulation of an intrusion upon seclusion
finds liability where a person intentionally invades, physically or
otherwise, the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reason-
able person.4 5 This claim consists solely of an intentional
interference with a person's interest in solitude or seclusion, either
as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind
that would be highly offensive to a reasonable man. 6 This theory
tracks the Privacy 1.0 model quite closely.
Appropriation of name or likeness occurs when a person makes
use of the name or likeness of another.47 Liability under the Re-
statement formulation can arise for publicity given to private life if
one gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of an-
other, where the matter publicized is of a kind that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and is not of legitimate concern
to the public.48 Both of these theories also track closely the Privacy
1.0 analysis, though they are more focused on the imposition of
liability. Finally, the Restatement imposes liability for publicity plac-
ing a person in false light.4 9 This theory would seem to be
44. Prosser, supra note 5, at 407.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976).
46. Id. § 652B cmt. a.
47. Id. § 652C.
48. Id. § 652D.
49. Id. § 652E.
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encompassed in prior theory, but Prosser believed that Warren and
Brandeis did not deal with this directly 0
III. THE WEAKNESSES OF COMMON LAW THEORIES
While the Prosser/Restatement model provides some additional
framework to understand privacy concepts, it still relies on com-
mon law, and is still based in tort theory. Inherently, this limits its
usefulness in addressing the privacy issues of today. One of the
limitations of a common law/tort based model is at some level
foreshadowed in the Warren and Brandeis article. Specifically,
when Warren and Brandeis dismissed property law as a basis for
the enforcement of privacy rights, they noted that "where the value
of the production is found not in the right to take profits arising
from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded
by the ability to prevent any publication at all, it is difficult to re-
gard the right as one of property."51 While this statement does not
directly relate to the main issue faced by individuals in privacy en-
forcement today-the lack of damages as a result of privacy
breaches-it certainly demonstrates the difficulty that tort-based
theories face in addressing the privacy issues of a Web 2.0 world.
Indeed, today numerous courts find that tort liability does not exist
in privacy cases that arise from the misuse of electronic informa-
tion where there is no economic loss. Thus, these courts seem to
decide, just as Warren and Brandeis noted about property claims,
that liability cannot exist for "the peace of mind or the relief af-
forded by the ability to prevent any publication at all ... " at least
where no economic loss has occurred.52
As a result, both the Warren/Brandeis and Prosser theories of
privacy have inherent weaknesses, particularly in an age of massive
electronic databases, the Internet and communication via social
networking. Moreover, given that the main risk to companies today
for privacy issues is either government enforcement or reputa-
tional harm that can destroy consumer confidence, an alterative to
the common law/tort model must be examined. Concepts such as
mitigation, while they exist in tort theory, place the burden on the
victim of the wrongful act. However, in many of today's privacy laws
(such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
50. "There is little indication that Warren and Brandeis intended to direct their article
at the fourth branch of the tort, the exploitation of attributes of the plaintiffs identity."
Prosser, supra note 5, at 401.
51. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4, at 200.
52. Id.
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and security breach notification laws), the obligation to mitigate
harm falls on the person or entity that caused the harm, not the
person that suffered the harm. Finally, as argued below, common
law theory does not account for a number of the privacy protec-
tions of our time, including "mitigation" statues, as well as credit
freeze laws and identity theft laws that restrict the misuse of infor-
mation of deceased individuals.
IV. THE FALL OF TORT THEORY
While, as demonstrated above, tort enforcement is the funda-
mental basis of Privacy 1.0 and 2.0, courts dealing with
informational privacy have rejected tort recovery. The vast majority
of these cases fail due to a perceived lack of damages.
In Trikas, 5 4 one of the first of such cases, the court rejected a
plaintiff's claim for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. In
this case, the plaintiff brought an action based upon the assertion
that an account erroneously remained open on his credit report.
The plaintiff claimed that he suffered emotional distress because
of this, even though it was admitted that no creditor actually saw or
• • 55
relied upon the erroneous information. Under the theory es-
poused by Warren and Brandeis, along with modern scholars,
liability should have attached. However, the court dismissed the
claim because the plaintiff could not prove that the alleged viola-
tion caused any damages and instead claimed to have suffered the
very type of mental anguish discussed by Warren and Brandeis.
There have been several recent cases that have addressed the is-
sue of whether the breach of a privacy policy can support litigation
against the party that did not comply with its privacy policy. Courts
have reached the conclusion that the mere breach of a privacy pol-
icy may not be sufficient to establish a claim for damages. In
53. It is hard to imagine a plaintiff less likely to bring a tort claim than a deceased vic-
tim of identity theft, though the social utility of having laws to prevent the misuse of
personal information, whether it involves the leaving or dead, cannot be questioned. How-
ever, concepts such as these are inherently inconsistent with common law concepts such as
standing and damages.
54. Trikas v. Universal Card Serv. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 27 (E.D.N.Y 2005).
55. Id. at 45 ("Here too, however, Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence of
damages to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff testified that he was never turned down for
any credit because of the Bank's actions, and that he never even applied for any credit dur-
ing the time his account remained erroneously open .... Plaintiff admits that he has not
suffered monetary damages: 'It's not a value that I suffered monetarily, as you could say it, a
dollar value, because this is, like I said, it's emotional, it's stress, it's burden."'). For a com-
plete discussion of these concepts and privacy litigation generally, see SERWIN, supra note 11,
at ch. 26.
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Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corps.,5' a group of plaintiffs sued North-
west Airlines for allegedly disclosing personal information
gathered via the Web to certain government agencies in direct vio-
lation of Northwest's posted privacy policy.57 Northwest advanced
two theories to defeat the plaintiffs' claims. First, that its online
policy was not a contract, but rather an aspirational policy whose
violation did not give rise to contractual liability. Second, North-
west Airlines argued that, even assuming that its act was a breach of
a contract, the plaintiffs could not show any damage that resulted
from the disclosure. The court accepted both arguments and dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claims, finding that there was no breach of
contract for several reasons, including a lack of damages."
In Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance,55 the Arizona district
court addressed issues related to causation and the speculative na-
ture of damages arising out of privacy breaches, even where
indisputably certain identity theft issues have occurred. Tri-West
maintained personal information regarding a number of current
and former members of the U.S. Military, as well as their depend-
ents, and had experienced security breaches where unauthorized
personnel entered their facilities. The plaintiff alleged that, despite
this event, another breach occurred when hard drives were stolen
from the same facility and these hard drives contained plaintiffs'
personal information. Some of the plaintiffs did not suffer identity
theft, but they incurred costs in connection with obtaining certain
reports regarding their credit, as well as identity theft insurance.
One of the plaintiffs had six credit accounts opened under his
60
name.
While the court noted that identity theft issues could frequently
result in damages other than purely pecuniary damages, this was
insufficient to state a claim for negligence, even though psycho-
logical or emotional distress, inconvenience and harm to credit
rating or reputation could occur.61 The plaintiffs attempted to
analogize a privacy breach that could lead to increased chance of
identity theft to toxic torts. The court soundly rejected this argu-
ment 2 by deciding that even though one of the plaintiffs had
56. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D. 2004).
57. Id. at 1197.
58. Id. at 1199-1200; see also In reAm. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Lifig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552
(N.D. Tex. 2005).
59. No. Civ. 03-0185PHXSRB, 2005 WL 2465906, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005).
60. Id.
61. Id. at *4.
62. Id. ("The Court must acknowledge the important distinction between toxic tort
and products liability cases, which necessarily and directly involve human health and safety,
and credit monitoring cases, which do not.").
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experienced credit issues, the court held that there was insufficient
evidence showing that it was caused by the theft of hard drives and
dismissed his claim as well.
63
The Ninth Circuit reviewed this decision and modified the
analysis.6 While it still upheld the dismissal of two of the three
plaintiffs' claims and completely rejected the medical monitoring
analogy, it reversed the judgment in favor of the third plaintiff,
finding that, given the unique factual circumstances, there could
be potential damages that flowed from the alleged disclosure of
information. It therefore reversed in part, affirmed in part, and
remanded the case.65 The district court in Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank
reached a similar conclusion.66 In this case, the plaintiffs' personal
information was obtained through a theft of computers that con-
tained unencrypted customer information including names,
addresses, social security numbers and account numbers. Again, it
was undisputed that plaintiffs had expended time and money to
monitor credit, but there was no indication that the information
had been accessed or misused. Consistent with the other decisions
cited above, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that they had
suffered damage as a result of the time and money they had spent
to monitor their credit, because the plaintiffs could not prove a
loss of earning capacity or wages.67 The court therefore rejected
both the breach of contract and negligence claims.
In Bell v. Acxiom, the court addressed the issue of damages in a
privacy case arising out of a computer hacking incident.68 The
plaintiff alleged that the hacking incident compromised her per-
sonally identifiable information and that "lax security" left her at
risk for privacy issues and for receiving junk mail.69 The main issue
addressed was whether the plaintiff had standing to pursue the
claim. Standing typically requires that a plaintiff satisfy three re-
quirements: (1) that the plaintiff has suffered injury which is
actual, concrete, and particularized; (2) that there is a causal con-
nection between the conduct complained of and the injury; and
(3) that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 7 It
63. Id. at *7.
64. See Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care Alliance, 254 Fed. Appx. 664, 668 (9th Cir.
2007).
65. Id. at 669.
66. 420 E Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2006).
67. Id. at 1020-21.
68. No. 4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 WL 2850042, at * 1 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006).
69. Id.
70. See id.; see also Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (citing United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669
(1973)); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
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should also be noted that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on
these issues1 and that potential, future injuries do not constitute a
sufficient showing by the plaintiff.7 2 In this case, because the plain-
tiff could not show injury or even that she received any junk mail,
the court dismissed her case.73
Similar conclusions have been reached by other courts, includ-
ing in Key v. DSW, Inc.4 Recently, in Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing
LP, an Ohio court followed the DSW decision by finding that eco-
nomic harm was a prerequisite for a plaintiff to state a claim for
damages. 5 Kahle concerned a security breach that could have re-
sulted in the disclosure of the plaintiff's personal information. 7
The defendant advised all affected individuals to place a credit
freeze on their report.77 The plaintiff could not establish any direct
damages, other than costs associated with a credit monitoring ser-
vice that the plaintiff purchased. 7s The court dismissed the claim,
holding that any alleged damages were too speculative, particularly
since the defendant had advised the plaintiff to place a free fraud
alert on her credit report.7 9 The court dismissed the claim despite
the fact that the plaintiff was seeking reimbursement of monies
paid for a credit monitoring service. ° In addition to this case,
courts are still routinely finding that damages resulting from future
identity theft are too speculative to be the basis of a successful civil
claim."' The lack of damages issue has also been addressed in the
(1983); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974).
71. See Bell, 2006 WL 2850042, at *1-2 (citing Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815,817 (8th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1090 (2005); Delorme v. United States, 354 F.3d 810, 815
(8th Cir. 2004)).
72. Id. at *2 (citing Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 1994); Whit-
more v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
73. Even if plaintiff had shown that she received junk mail, it is unlikely whether this
would have been a sufficient showing of injury. Id. at *2 (citing Walters v. DHL Express, No.
05-1255, 2006 WL 1314132, at *5 (C.D. Ill. May 12, 2006)).
74. 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688-89 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citing Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281
F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2002)) ("Therefore, because the specific factual allegations of the
Amended Complaint ... do not allege that the Plaintiff has personally experienced any
injury other than 'hav[ing] been subjected to a substantial increased risk of identity theft or
other related financial crimes,' the Court must accept the specific allegations Plaintiff makes
as a true representation of the injury that the Plaintiff has suffered.").
75. 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709-10 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
76. Id. at 706.
77. Id. at 707.
78. Id. at 709-713.
79. Id. at 712-13.
80. Id. at 713.
81. See, e.g., Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007)
(dismissing claim for future identity theft arising from the theft of a laptop computer).
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context of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),82 at least for
claims of actual damages. 3 FCRA does, however, permit recovery of
statutory damages for willful violations and claims without damages
can, sometimes, survive.84 This was also the conclusion in cases in-
volving American AirlinesS5 and JetBlue.8
The failings of tort theory also are apparent when one considers
how the law typically treats cyber defamation cases. The Communi-
cations Decency Act8 7 provides broad immunity to publishers on
the Internet for postings by third-parties and this law reflects the
decision of Congress to protect the Internet from "overzealous"
laws. While tort remedies can exist against the poster, there is no
liability for the publisher and, perhaps more importantly, no obli-
gation for the publisher to remove admittedly defamatory
content."" Thus, while a tort remedy might exist against the poster
of the information, who in many cases is hard to identify and may
not have sufficient assets to satisfy any judgment, the defamatory
information still remains available and continues to cause damage.
While this is not to say that privacy tort claims do not succeed,
this sampling of cases demonstrates that particularly for informa-
tional privacy concerns, a theory based on tort law concepts has
significant limitations, at least at this point in jurisprudence. This is
especially true since government enforcement is frequently the
motivating factor for privacy compliance.
V. THE RISE OF THE FTC-CURRENT ENFORCEMENT THEORIES
AND THEIR RELIANCE UPON PROPORTIONALITY
Proportionality is more consistent with the theoretical under-
pinnings of recent FTC enforcement actions than a common law
based theory, particularly in light of the recent FTC behavioral ad-
vertising guidance.8 9 The FTC is the main privacy enforcement
agency at the federal level and truly sets the tone for privacy
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
83. Schroeder v. Capitol Indemnity Corp., No. 05-C-643, 2006 WL 2009053, at *1 (E.D.
Wis. July 17, 2006) (granting summary judgment, in part, and dismissing portion of claim
under FCRA because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of actual injury).
84. Id. at *4-5 (citing Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 E3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006)).
85. In re American Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 567 (N.D. Tex.
2005).
86. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 E Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding loss of privacy is not a recoverable damage under a breach of contract theory).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
88. See Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997); see also
SERWIN, supra note 11, § 2:6-2:16.
89. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 16.
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compliance in the United States, as is shown by the number of pri-
vacy and security enforcement actions brought by the FTC, as well
as the record fines recently levied. Section 45 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (the FTC Act), one of the main bases of the FTC's
enforcement power, makes "[u] nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce" unlawful. ° While the deceptiveness prong of
Section 45 was the more common enforcement mechanism, as dis-
cussed below, recent cases have increasingly relied on the
unfairness prong of the FTC Act.9'
The most recent guidance from the FTC, Online Behavioral Ad-
vertising Moving the Discussion Forward to Possible Self-Regulatory
Principles, seems to match the ideas behind the principle of propor-
tionality.92 In this publication the FTC recognizes the need to
balance support for innovation with the need to protect consumers
from harm. Moreover, the FTC also acknowledged the benefits
that consumers derive from information sharing, including free
information and services on the Internet. 94 Finally, the FTC noted
that, for purposes of data security, the sensitivity of the data is an
important factor in coming up with a behavioral advertising
framework.9' This was the case because, while certain forms of data
collected for behavioral advertising are sensitive, there are other
forms that are not identifiable and therefore not as problematic if
wrongfully acquired. Both concepts are difficult for tort law to ad-
dress, but they are inherently consistent with the principle of
proportionality.
In re Vision I Properties, LLC concerned an FTC investigation of a
company that licensed shopping cart software and related services
to online retailers.96 These websites made specific representations
regarding privacy, including that personal information was not
sent, sold, or leased to third-parties.97 The FTC alleged that Vision I
violated the FTC Act9 because the portions of the websites that
90. 15 U.S.C.A. § 4 5(a) (1) (West 2009).
91. See, for example, In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., File No. 042-3160, 2005 WL
1541551 (F.T.C. June 16, 2005), in which the FTC alleged that the mere failure to secure
credit card information, though there was no specific statutory requirement to do so, was an
unfair business practice.
92. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 16.
93. See id. at 1.
94. See id. at 2.
95. See id. at 4.
96. Docket No. C-4135, File No. 0423068, 2005 WL 1274741 (ET.C. Apr. 19, 2005).
97. Id.
98. This matter involved a draft complaint that was not filed because the matter was
resolved via consent order.
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gathered customers' information were Vision I's which did not dis-
close to customers that the privacy practices on these pages were
different from other pages, despite the fact that the pages ap-
peared to be part of the same website. 99 The FTC claimed that
Vision I also rented the customers' information to third-parties,
despite the privacy statements made by the retailers.'00 Further-
more, Vision I allegedly failed to disclose to its clients Vision I's
practice of renting out customer information. 10' The FTC consid-
ered these acts to be violations of the FTC Act. 02 The consent
order that was entered into by Vision I restricted its ability to dis-
close customers' personally identifiable information, required it to
pay certain costs, mandated additional disclosures regarding Vision
I's privacy practices and placed it under reporting obligations to
the FTC. 103
The importance of this enforcement action was that, unlike
prior enforcement cases, there was no direct representation to
consumers by Vision I-a standard prerequisite for deceptive prac-
tices under Section 45. Thus, at that point, it remained unclear
whether the FTC was relying upon a third-party beneficiary theory
or its ability to act against unfair business practices.
The FTC began clearly using the "unfairness" prong of the FTC
Act in In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. This case represents a marked
departure from prior FTC actions in that the FTC relied upon its
unfairness authority and, unlike prior enforcement cases, did not
rely upon an allegedly deceptive statement regarding information
security. BJ's Wholesale Club operates a number of membership
warehouse stores.1 05 As part of its normal business, BJ's accepted
credit cards as a form of payment from its members. 16 BJ's col-
lected personally identifiable information from its customers to
authorize their credit cards.' 7 It also used wireless technology, in-
cluding wireless access points and scanners to monitor inventory.'08
The FTC filed a complaint against BJ's, alleging that BJ's failed to
encrypt information while it was in transit or stored on the net-
work, stored personally identifiable information in a file format
that permitted anonymous access, did not use readily accessible
99. Vision IProperties, 2005 WL 1274741.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. File No. 042-3160, 2005 WL 1541551 (FT.C.June 16,2005).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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security measures to limit access, failed to employ sufficient meas-
ures to detect unauthorized access or conduct security
investigations, and created unnecessary business risks by storing
information after it had any use for the information, in violation of
bank rules.' °9
The FFC alleged that, as a result of this conduct, millions of dol-
lars in fraudulent purchases had been made." ° Although BJ's
conduct did not directly violate any federal statute, the FTC con-
cluded that these acts constituted an unfair business practice
under the FTC Act and brought an enforcement action against
BJ's."' In the past, the FTC had only acted in the security arena
when a company was subject to heightened security burdens (un-
der statutes such as HIPAA, 1 2 the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act,13 and the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act" 4) or when the
company had made specific security promises. Here, however, the
FTC showed that, even in the absence of a specific representation
or a statutory burden, companies can face enforcement action for
a lack of information security based upon its "unfairness" author-
ity.
15
The use of the unfairness doctrine by the FTC is consistent with
the principle of proportionality because the unfairness doctrine
examines the unreasonable harm to consumers which, at least in
part, rests upon the sensitivity of data. While the unfairness doc-
trine is an evolving one, the FTC did provide some guidance
regarding what constitutes an unfair practice when it issued its Un-
fairness Statement 6 in 1980. The Commission stated that
"[u]njustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the FTC
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
113. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (West
2009).
114. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Fin. Serv. Modernization Act, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
115. While In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. was the first FTC enforcement action to directly
rely upon this theory, the unfairness theory was put forth several years before by Commis-
sioner Mozelle Thompson in a separate statement in the In re ReverseAuction.com, Inc. matter.
Mozelle Thompson, Statement of Comm'r Mozelle W. Thompson in In re ReverseAuc-
tion.com, Inc., File no. 0023046 (2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reversemt.htm. Commissioner
Thompson asserted that the FTC had the ability to bring data security enforcement actions
based upon the allegation that a lack of data security was an unfair practice. Id.
116. Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John
Danforth, Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in In re Int'l
Harvester Co., 104 FT.C. 1070 (1984).
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Act"117 and also noted "that to justify a finding of unfairness, any
consumer injury must satisfy three tests: (1) the injury must be sub-
stantial; (2) it must be not outweighed by any offsetting benefits to
consumers or competition; and (3) the injury must be one that
consumers could not reasonably have avoided."" 8 The FTC added
that, "[a]lthough public policy" has been listed "as a separate con-
sideration, it is used most frequently by the Commission as a means
of providing additional evidence on the degree of consumer injury
caused by specific practices."" 9
The formulation of the FTC's Unfairness Statement is impor-
tant, particularly now that the FTC is using unfairness as a basis for
enforcement actions. Thus, the FTC's focus on the balancing of
consumer injury against benefits to consumers or competition is an
analysis inherently consistent with the principle of proportionality
that underlies Privacy 3.0.
The failing of theories based upon confidentiality has been rec-
ognized by some courts. In Burnett, a New Jersey Court addressed
whether the constitutional right of privacy expressed in a state con-
stitution protected the disclosure of Social Security numbers in
records that were otherwise public records.2 0 The fact that Social
Security numbers were not always non-public did not stop the
court from concluding that the disclosure of Social Security num-
bers violated the New Jersey constitution. 12 This conclusion has
been reached by other courts that have found the disclosure of So-
cial Security numbers can violate individuals' rights of privacy,
including under the federal and state constitutions, as well as pub-
lic records laws. 22 Part of the issue with Social Security numbers is
the potential for misuse that courts have noted:
While the release of all city employees' [social security num-
ber]s would provide inquirers with little useful information
about the organization of their government, the release of the
numbers could allow an inquirer to discover the intimate,
117. In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 ETC. at 1073; see also SERWIN, supra note 11, § 12:1-
12:7.
118. In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 ET.C. at 1073-74.
119. Id. at 1075.
120. Burnett v. County Of Bergen, 954 A.2d 483,484 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
121. Id. at 497.
122. See, e.g., Aronson v. Internal Revenue Serv., 767 F Supp. 378, 388 (D. Mass. 1991);
Oliva v. U.S., 756 F Supp. 105, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Data Tree, LLC v. Meek, 109 P.3d 1226,
1237-38 (Kan. 2005); Zink v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994); State
ex rel. Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. City of Akron, 640 N.E.2d 164, 165-66 (Ohio 1994),
reconsideration denied, 642 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio 1994); Tribune-Review v. Allegheny County
Hous. Auth., 662 A.2d 677, 683 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
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personal details of each city employee's life, which are com-
pletely irrelevant to the operations of government. As the
Greidinger court warned, a person's SSN is a device which can
quickly be used by the unscrupulous to acquire a tremendous
113amount of information about a person.
Thus, sensitivity, not confidentiality, was the touchstone of the
court's analysis. Certain courts have held that, though sensitive in-
formation is publicly available, there still may be a protectable
right that precludes disclosure. In addressing the disclosure of ad-
dresses, one court noted:
It is true that home addresses often are publicly available
through sources such as telephone directories and voter regis-
tration lists, but "[in] an organized society, there are few facts
that are not at one time or another divulged to another." The
privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 "encompass [es] the
individual's control of information concerning his or her per-
son." An individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of
information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply be-
cause that information may be available to the public in some form.2 4
VII. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLE BASED ANALYSIS
The inherent limitations of prior privacy principles and the
emergence of an F-TC enforcement centric model in the United
States could lead one to conclude that these privacy principles are
not needed. The fact that so many legal scholars have tried to
bring forth a viable theory, despite the prior hurdles, shows the
need and the importance of a workable theoretical construct. The
need for principles to guide privacy law can be seen by the number
of countries that have adopted principle-based statutes. It is also
shown by organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), which was one of the first
organizations to promulgate privacy principles through non-
binding guidelines. Though the United States is a member of the
OECD, it has not adopted these concepts in any way. However,
these principles form the theoretical framework for the European
Union's Data Directive, which created the privacy protections that
123. Beacon Journal, 640 N.E.2d at 169 (citing Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344 (4th
Cir. 1993)).
124. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 409 (1995) (emphasis added).
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exist in the EU today. The first principle of the OECD Guidelines is
collection limitation which calls for "limits to the collection of per-
sonal data" along with requirements that "any such data should be
obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the
knowledge or consent of the data subject. 1 25 The second principle
concerns data quality and it requires that personal data "be rele-
vant to the purposes for which they are used, and, to the extent
necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and
kept up-to-date." 26 The third principle is purpose specification
which mandates that the reason for personal data collection be
specified at the time of data collection and that the subsequent use
be limited to the fulfillment of these purposes or other compatible
purposes that must be specified on each occasion of change of
purpose.1 7 The OECD Guidelines also suggest that "personal data
should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for pur-
poses other than those specified in accordance with [these
requirements] except with the consent of the data subject; or by
the authority of law.'
12 8
The fourth OECD principle covers security safeguards. "Per-
sonal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards
against risks such as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification or disclosure of data.' 2 The fifth principle is open-
ness and the Guidelines suggest that "[t]here should be a general
policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with
respect to personal data."0 Additionally, readily available means
should exist to establish "the existence and nature of personal
data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and
usual residence of the data controller."2 ' The sixth principle re-
lates to individual participation. 2 The Guidelines suggest certain
125. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CON-
CERNING GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE PROT. OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERS.
DATA § 7 (1980) [hereinafter OECD, RECOMMENDATION].
126. Id. § 8.
127. Id. § 9.
128. Id. § 10.
129. Id. § 11.
130. Id. § 12.
131. Id. § 12. "'Data controller' means a party who, according to domestic law, is com-
petent to decide about the contents and use of personal data regardless of whether or not
such data are collected, stored, processed or disseminated by that party or by an agent on its
behalf." ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROT. OF PRI-
VACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERS. DATA § I(a) (1980) [hereinafter OECD,
GUIDELINES].
132. OECD, RECOMMENDATION, supra note 125, § 13.
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controls and limitations that place restrictions that are reasonably
related to the use and collection of the data.
31
The seventh principle pertains to accountability and it suggests
that a data controller should be responsible for complying with
measures that give effect to these principles.3 4 The eighth and final
principle covers international application. The Guidelines encour-
age member countries to consider "the implications for other
[m]ember countries of domestic processing and re-export of per-
sonal data.', 3 5 Member states are also encouraged to "take all
reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that transborder flows
of personal data,3 6 including transit through a member country,"
remain "uninterrupted and secure.",1v A member country is cau-
tioned to "refrain from restricting transborder flows of personal
data between itself and another [m]ember country except where
the latter does not substantially observe these Guidelines or where
the re-export of such data would circumvent its domestic privacy
legislation. '38
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) also adopted
principles that have served as the basis for privacy legislation in the
Pacific Rim. 39 APEC's guidelines, which are similar to OPEC's, con-
sist of preventing harm, providing notice, limiting data collection,
regulating uses of personal information, choice (regarding collec-
tion and use), ensuring integrity of personal information,
developing security safeguards, controlling access and correction
(to rectify any inaccuracies), and establishing accountability. 40
These concepts are important to note because they demonstrate
that principles can dramatically impact privacy legislation, since
these serve as the theoretical construct of the EU Data Directive.14 1
As discussed below, even England implemented the OECD princi-
ples instead of its own common law in constructing a theoretical
framework for privacy laws.
133. OECD, RECOMMENDATION, supra note 125, § 13(a)-(d).
134. Id.§ 14.
135. Id. § 15.
136. "'Transborder flows of personal data' means movements of personal data across
national borders." OECD, GUIDELINES, supra note 131, § 1 (c).
137. OECD, RECOMMENDATION, supra note 125, § 16.
138. Id. § 17.
139. See SERWIN, supra note 11, at ch. 1 for a complete discussion of these principles.
140. SERWIN, supra note 11, § 1:16.
141 Id
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VIII. ENGLISH COMMON LAW IS NOT THE ANSWER
Some scholars have suggested that an alternative theory of Eng-
lish common law based upon confidences, which was not
considered by Warren and Brandeis, is the answer. However, the
law of confidences fails for three reasons. First, as argued above,
common law theories based upon tort remedies have not faired
well in the United States and will continue to fail as long as the
damages and standing issues exist. Second, our society, in contrast
to the societal values of England at the time that the confidence
cases were decided, values information sharing, albeit with appro-
priate limitations.
Third, the theory of confidences, as a matter of policy, has not
been adopted even by the English as their overarching policy.
While English common law is certainly important to consider, the
reality is that England has not chosen to rely on common law pri-
vacy protections and instead has protected privacy in a more
comprehensive way than through its common law-it has imple-
mented the EU's Data Directive. Perhaps more importantly, it did
so through the adoption of a number of principles that in no way
relate to the common law theory of confidences. Although English
law does not explicitly recognize proportionality, its distinctions
between personal data"43 and sensitive personal information'" re-
semble the tiers created by the application of the principle of
proportionality.
The United Kingdom's Data Protection Act of 1998 mandates
compliance with eight key principles for anyone processing per-
sonal information. These key principles require "that personal
142. Id.
143. "'Personal data' means data which relate to a living individual who can be identi-
fied-(a) from those data, or (b) from those data and other information which is in the
possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller, and includes
any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the
data controller or any other person in respect of the individual." Data Protection Act, 1998,
c. 29, pt. I, § 1 (Eng.).
144. Notably:
"sensitive personal data" means personal data consisting of information as to-(a)
the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject, (b) his political opinions, (c) his reli-
gious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, (d) whether he is a member of a
trade union (within the meaning of the ... Trade Union and Labor Relations (Con-
solidation) Act 1992), (e) his physical or mental health or condition, (f) his sexual
life, (g) the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence, or (h) any
proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed by him,
the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings.
Id. at c. 29, pt. I, § 2.
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information is: fairly and lawfully processed; processed for limited
purposes; adequate, relevant and not excessive; accurate and up to
date; not kept longer than is necessary; processed in line with [in-
dividuals'] rights; secure; not transferred to other countries
without adequate protection."'45 Nowhere in these principles is the
concept of confidence. Thus, if we are to look for a framework to
follow for United States law, it should not be one that was rejected,
at least implicitly, by England when it adopted its main data protec-
tion law. While one could conclude that following the English
model, based upon the principles adopted in its Data Protection
Act, is the answer to United States privacy concerns, these princi-
ples have not, and likely will not, be adopted as a model of United
States privacy protection, because the United States has shown no
real interest in adopting a principle-based law, though they do im-
pact United States companies in certain circumstances.
IX. THE U.S. ADOPTION OF EU-LIKE PRINCIPLES
While the United States has not used EU principles to end the
hurricane noted by Prosser, U.S. law does not exclude these prin-
ciples entirely. In order to solve the issue created by the EU finding
that the United States' privacy laws were deficient, and therefore
precluding transfer of personal information to the United States, a
compromise was struck between the Department of Commerce
and the EU. 46 This resulted in the creation of the safe harbor pro-
gram which allows American companies conducting trans-Atlantic
transactions to comply with the EU privacy requirements in a sim-
plified manner. 47 A United States company could certify that it
complied with the safe harbor principles and then transfer data
from the EU to the United States.4 8 There are seven U.S. privacy
principles and they are: notice, choice, onward transfer, access, se-
curity, data integrity, and enforcement.
4 9
145. Information Commissioner's Office, The Data Prot. Act: The Basics, http://
www.ico.gov.uk/what we-cover/data-protection/thebasics.aspx. (last visited May 14, 2009)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
146. Export.gov, Safe Harbor Overview, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/egmain_
018236.asp (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR PRINCIPLES (2000) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/
eu/sh-en-privacyl .asp.
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While they exist, these principles do not serve as the theoretical
construct for privacy laws in the United States. Although the Inter-
net and electronic communications are world-wide technologies, it
is notable that the United States has not adopted the concepts that
the vast majority of other developed nations have. One of the ex-
planations for the failure to adopt the EU principles is differences
in cultural norms regarding information sharing.
X. A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF SOCIETAL VIEWS IN THE
UNITED STATES ON INFORMATION SHARING AND MANAGEMENT
Concerns over privacy in the United States relate less to con-
cepts such as publicity given to private life, because at least in
certain circumstances many people actually seek out opportunities
to publicize private aspects of their lives. Social networking, blog-
ging, and relatively easily obtainable consumer credit all depend
on information sharing to function. In our consumer credit driven
culture, the information sharing that is the cornerstone of readily-
available credit is critical to many and at least a significant luxury
to others. None of these concepts are exclusively rooted in the
U.S., but the liberal American view of information sharing may be
the reason why social networking web sites originated in the U.S.
This is not to say that information sharing does not have a socie-
tal price-the more information that is available, particularly in a
public forum, the greater the chance for misdeeds. Despite these
well-known risks, the concern most people have today is not com-
pletely being "let alone" or imposing tort liability for misuse, but
rather permitting (and even facilitating) the publication of their
personal information while retaining some control over its use.
That is not to say that individuals do not want privacy. In a very real
sense people are in many ways as desirous of privacy as ever, but
they want also to enjoy the benefits of increased information shar-
ing, particularly at a time of increased reliance on computers for
information. In one of the more colorful discussions of the issue,
one Ninth Circuit judge offered the following:
[F]or most people, their computers are their most private
spaces. People commonly talk about the bedroom as a very
private space, yet when they have parties, all the guests-
including perfect strangers-are invited to toss their coats on
Privacy 3. 0
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the bed. But if one of those guests is caught exploring the
host's computer, that will be his last invitation. 5°
While this statement is undoubtedly true, that same computer
owner may be posting extensive details about himself on a social
networking site via that very same computer. In other words, the
theoretical basis of today's privacy construct should be propor-
tional restrictions, not outright prohibitions. This concept is the
underlying basis of Privacy 3.0.
XI. PRIVACY 3.0
Given the current rapid progress of technology, any new privacy
theory would need to provide guidance to individuals or entities
that collect or process data where the law has not yet caught up to
practices. As noted above, a good example of the need for this type
of model is the recent pretexting debate and its resulting flurry of
laws. Moreover, the theory should provide a unifying principle to
understand both the numerous current privacy laws and those be-
ing enacted at an increasing pace, be consistent with current
enforcement theories, and help align laws and doctrines that are
inconsistent with this principle. This leads us to the next iteration
of privacy-Privacy 3.0.
Rather than focusing on broad rights, such as the right to be let
alone, or tort concepts that do not lend themselves to the age we
live in, Privacy 3.0 is built upon one principle-the principle of
proportionality. While this concept is more relevant to this time
period, it alone would not go far enough. In order to be complete,
the principle of proportionality must be applied and used to create
four tiers of personal information: highly sensitive information,
sensitive information, slightly sensitive information, and non-
sensitive information. The level of security and privacy associated
with each tier varies according to the sensitivity of the information,
as do the methods that can be used to collect, process and use in-
formation.
The advantage of the tiers created by the application of the
principle of proportionality is the incorporation of a principle-
based approach in a way that does not operate to stifle information
sharing as some current principle-based approaches do, while si-
multaneously defining permissible and non-permissible actions
150. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Kleinfeld,
J. dissenting).
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based upon the tier within which the information falls, even in the
absence of specific statutory guidance. Thus, even if the law regard-
ing a particular form of information is unclear or non-existent, a
company seeking guidance in an uncharted area can assess its
conduct by comparing what is permitted with other similar forms
of information. This approach also provides clarity regarding the
underpinnings of existing laws and guidance regarding future laws
that will be necessary as new types of information and information
sharing become more ubiquitous.
Categories of information will be placed in the tiers based upon
a number of factors. The nature of the information, including how
much the information reveals about an individual or a business51
(e.g., predispositions, preferences, personality traits, or susceptibil-
ity to diseases) is a critical factor to consider. The level of impact
caused by disclosure of the information, whether to an individual
or society, must also be considered when placing a category of in-
formation into a tier. The social utility of sharing of information
will also be considered, as well as the actual location of the infor-
mation, since information that is in the public domain or in a third
party's hands is sometimes subject to reduced protection. 5'
Whether the information can be used to obtain or create other
information (such as a Social Security number) is a further factor
that affects the placement of information into a tier. The commu-
nication medium (including the form of the information) is also a
factor to consider when examining the tier structure. Also, given
the analysis used by courts in Fourth Amendment cases, as well as
trade secret cases involving proprietary information, the steps the
person or business took to protect the privacy of the information
represent a critical factor as well.
153
Once information is placed into a tier, predicting how it can be
collected and used is possible, because information collection,
management, processing, use, and disposal all flows from the tier
within which the category of information falls. Thus, there are
common elements that I will be discussing regarding each tier.
These include:
151. One advantage of this model is that it can bring consistency to laws related to in-
formational privacy, whether they impact businesses or individuals, where appropriate.
152. Considering the social utility of sharing information would include a risk benefit
analysis that would weigh the harm from disclosure and the potential misuse that could
follow from unauthorized access or use versus the individual and societal benefit that is
actually achieved from sharing information.
153. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) ("The ultimate question, there-
fore, is whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all
the surrounding circumstances.").
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whether information can be gathered without no-
tice or consent;
* whether consent must be opt-in or opt-out;
* the effect of consent;
* the types of processing that can be done;
* can information be gathered under false pretenses;
* are there time restrictions upon the retention of the
data;
* data security requirements;
* data destruction requirements;
* what steps are required, or permitted, to mitigate
any mishandling of information; and
penalties for misuse of the information, including
the imposition of statutory penalties in certain
cases.
While in the vast majority of cases the state and federal govern-
ment have followed a similar path and the protection afforded by
the law is consistent, others have not followed a uniform path in
enacting laws. As such, there will be laws, or portions of laws as
noted below, that will be exceptions to the general categories de-
scribed below. However, in many of these circumstances, where
legislation was enacted inconsistently with this model, courts have
struggled with applying the law, particularly in situations such as
the imposition of the interruption in service requirement under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
5 4
A. Tier I-Highly Sensitive Information
Tier I information would cover extremely sensitive 155 informa-
tion and would be subject to strong limitations on collection,
processing and disclosure, though in certain extremely limited in-
stances, the information could be collected and used without
154. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2009).
155. While there can be subjective disagreement about what information is or is not ex-
tremely sensitive, in most cases there will be agreement regarding the categorization. Factors
such as personal circumstances can impact someone's subjective belief about sensitivity, but
the categorization of information into Tiers would in many cases have to depend upon what
society defines as sensitive in an analysis that in certain ways might be similar to the Fourth
Amendment analysis of reasonable expectations of privacy on computers for government
searches. See, e.g., United States v. Ziegler, 456 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), as modified, 474 E3d
1184 (9th Cir. 2007). This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment analysis provides all of
the answers, but it might provide some guidance where there are divergent views.
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consent, particularly by the government. Examples of Tier I data
would include genetic information, sexual history or other related
issues, religious affiliation, information regarding communicable
diseases, various forms of health information, personal information
regarding children under certain ages (particularly if it is gathered
via the Internet), highly proprietary or confidential business in-
formation, and images or videotapes of conduct in private areas.
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) may ultimately fall within
this category and, despite the current debate, so will Passenger
Name Records (PNR) and other forms of location tracking. 56
Generally these types of information cannot be gathered without
the express consent of the data subject, unless there is a truly com-
pelling governmental purpose, such as national security or crime
prevention, and even then, only in limited circumstances. For ex-
ample, government agencies can collect DNA of offenders
convicted of certain crimes and this information can be processed
for a limited period of time in a computer software program
known as CODIS for the purpose of solving crimes./17 Additionally,
other examples of non-consensual collection or processing of this
type of information are the often mandatory disclosures to gov-
ernmental agencies that health care providers are required to
make regarding communicable diseases.1
5
1
However, if the data subject gives consent, processing and use of
such information would be permitted, but only in limited circum-
stances. Moreover, there frequently are time restrictions on the
retention of the information as well as requirements of high levels
of data security. Violation of laws pertaining to Tier I information
should give rise to severe civil and even criminal sanctions.
156. The acquisition of location tracking data has been a difficult issue for courts, be-
cause the installation of a pen register on a cellular telephone can permit location tracking
data to be gathered. Courts have reached different conclusions about the level of proof
needed to monitor such data. In one matter, a magistrate judge rejected the government's
request to obtain cellular site data which would have permitted the government to track a
suspect's whereabouts. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. and the Prod. of Real
Time Cell Site Info., 415 F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D. W. Va. 2006); but c.f In re Application of U.S.
for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records and Authorizing the Use of a PIN Regis-
ter and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (permitting the gathering of
location tracking information); In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace device
with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same). These cases all
treat the information as Tier I data, whether they permit disclosures based upon national
security or a warrant. See SERwIN, supra note 11, § 5:67.
157. SeeSERWIN, supra note 11, §§ 31:51-52.
158. Seeid.§ 11:48
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B. Tier II--Sensitive Information
Tier II would cover still quite sensitive information which would
not rise to the same level of sensitivity as Tier I information. Exam-
ples of Tier II information would include the content of wire or
electronic communications (if gathered precisely at the time of the
communication), certain forms of health information, video rental
and television programming preferences, financial information,
consumer's purchasing preferences (if tied to their identity), and
Social Security numbers (particularly when combined with per-
sons' names). Generally, this information would be gathered with
or without consent of the data subject or with opt-in consent. Even
if information could be collected without notice or consent, under
current law it would be unlawful to do so under false pretenses,
especially if the information would be used for a fraudulent pur-
pose. Already under today's privacy laws, mandatory public display
of what I classify as Tier II information is prohibited (as is shown by
Social Security number laws).
The processing and use of Tier II information would hold fewer
restrictions than for Tier I information. Nevertheless, the process-
ing of this type of data would still have to be related to a legitimate
purpose. The government would have an increased ability to ob-
tain Tier II information, even without a warrant, as it can already
do so under its Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act159 and USA
PATRIOT Act '6 authority. As financial identity theft laws illustrate,
fraudulent uses are already prohibited, even if information is gath-
ered legally. In terms of time restrictions, Tier II information
would have to be destroyed after the entity holding the data would
no longer need it. Data security requirements for Tier II would not
be as rigorous as for Tier I data. Although the main remedies for
misuse of Tier II information would be civil, criminal penalties
could be imposed as well. Given the sensitivity of Tier II informa-
tion, as with Tier I information, liquidated and statutory damages
could be available even if actual damages cannot be proven.
C. Tier II--Slightly Sensitive Information
Tier III would pertain to personally identifiable information of a
lower privacy profile than the information in Tiers I and II. To the
159. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).
160. Uniting And Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
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extent the information would be sensitive, Tier III would comprise
of information that would be routed through a third party and,
thus, there would be a decreased expectation of privacy. Examples
of Tier III information would include connection records from
telephone companies or Internet Service Providers (ISP) (but not
the content of the communications), financial information regard-
ing consumer debts, information disclosed on an employer's
computer network, and images captured in a public space. Con-
nection records from an ISP, including IP addresses of websites
visited, as well as to/from addresses for email, have also been held,
at least by the Ninth Circuit, not to be private, based upon a pen
register analogy."' Consequently, these records would fall in Tier
111.162 This information could be gathered without consent and no-
tice would typically not be required. Individuals could stop
improper processing, but non-abusive processing should be per-
mitted without consent. The government would have much more
latitude to collect this type of information, at times without a war-
rant, as is shown by the more limited restrictions on pen registers.
Tier III information could not be gathered under false pretenses,
especially if collected with fraudulent intent, which is shown by the
recently enacted pretexting laws.
There would be general restrictions on data retention and de-
struction, but these requirements would not be as rigorous as those
for Tier I and II and only reasonable steps would be necessary to
secure and destroy data. Enforcement would be exclusively civil,
though fraudulent uses could subject a person to criminal sanc-
tions.
D. Tier N-Non-Sensitive Information
Tier IV would contain personally identifiable, yet not truly pri-
vate information. Examples of Tier IV information would include a
161. Pen registers are devices that disclose the telephone numbers that an individual
called. These devices do not disclose the content of the communication.
162. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Neither this
nor any other circuit has spoken to the constitutionality of computer surveillance tech-
niques that reveal the to/from addresses of e-mail messages, the IP addresses of websites
visited and the total amount of data transmitted to or from an account. We conclude that
these surveillance techniques are constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen
register that the Court approved in Smith .... Analogously, e-mail and Internet users have
no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of
the websites they visit because they should know that these messages are sent and these IP
addresses are accessed through the equipment of their Internet service provider and other
third parties.").
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person's name, email address, telephone number, and address.
Tier IV information could be collected without consent; however, if
consent were necessary, an opt-out procedure could be available.
While much of this information would be public, fraudulently
gathering the information would not be permitted, particularly if
doing so would misidentify the person requesting the information
or further other misconduct. There would be a few restrictions on
processing, but fraudulent acts and deception would not be per-
mitted. Although data retention and destruction concerns would
exist, there would be no extensive requirements on this type of
data. Criminal enforcement could exist in limited circumstances,
such as when other fraudulent acts would be undertaken using this
type of information, but typically only civil remedies would be
available for violations related to Tier IV information.
XII. PRIVACY 3.0-LAws THAT VALIDATE THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY
While common law has not followed the principle of propor-
tionality, existing legislation has incorporated the concept into
numerous statutory schemes. What follows is a sampling of statutes
that track this principle, as well as the protection afforded by the
classification of information into tiers.
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)163
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was enacted to ad-
dress the increasing number of computer crimes that were not
covered under existing law.64 Up until 1994, the CFAA only pro-
vided criminal penalties, but statutory amendments to the CFAA
added civil remedies that can be used by companies to protect
their network and recover damages for unauthorized access. 6 5 The
CFAA can apply in a variety of contexts. It can be relevant in cases
where business competitors improperly engage in certain conduct,
including "scraping" websites.1" It is becoming more of an issue
when employees depart and use a network to send or obtain trade
secret information. It also, of course, applies in the more tradi-
163. 18 U.S.CA § 1030 (West 2008).
164. See SERWIN, supra note 11, at ch. 3.
165. Id. § 3:1.
166. Id. § 3:18 (citing EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir.
2001)).
[VOL. 42:4
SUMMER 2009]
tional settings, including those involving hacking and the release
of worms, Trojan horses, or other malicious programs, as well as
the misappropriation or damage of private information.
Under the CFAA, criminal liability attaches when an individual
"intentionally accesses a computer without authorization," or be-
yond the scope of any authorized use. 67 This applies regardless of
whether the computer is owned by the government or the conduct
involves interstate or foreign communication.6' It is also a criminal
act to "knowingly, and with the intent to defraud, access a pro-
tected computer:" (i) without authorization or (ii) beyond the
scope of any authorization, if the person furthers a fraud and an
item of any value is obtained, if the value obtained is over $5,000 in
any one year period.169 The wages of employees used to repair the
damage can be considered when a court analyzes the $5,000 re-
quirement. 170 It is also unlawful for a person to "knowingly cause
the transmission" of a program, code or command that intention-
ally: (1) damages a protected computer, (2) accesses a protected
computer and recklessly causes damage, or (3) accesses a pro-
tected computer without authorization and causes resulting
damage.
While this law appears to be quite broad, it recognizes and is
consistent with the principle of proportionality. In order to prevail
in a CFAA case, the plaintiff must show damage that is different
than the tort concept of damage. Instead, in order to prove dam-
age, the harm must be one of the following types: aggregated
damage that exceeds $5,000; potential modification or impairment
of a medical diagnosis, examination, treatment or care of one or
more persons; physical injury; a threat to public health or safety; or
damage to a government computer that is used in furtherance of
the administration of justice, national defense or national secu-
rity.
172
Notably, the damage issue still exists with the CFAA. Consistent
with the damage issue presented by tort claims, courts have held
that only expenses, specifically any "natural and foreseeable" ex-
penses, are part of the damages amounts that can be considered,
167. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a) (2) (West 2008).
168. Id. § 1030(a) (3).
169. Id. § 1030(a) (4); see alsoYourNetDating, Inc. v. Mitchell, 88 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D.
Ill. 2000); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2000).
171. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a) (5) (A) (i)-(iii) (West 2008).
172. Id. § 1030.
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but neither damages for emotional distress or punitive damages
are recoverable. 73
The CFAA is a law that predominantly deals with what I define as
Tier I information, because the information involved must impli-
cate national security, medical information, or information that
can cause more than trivial harm. The level of restrictions on dis-
closure of sensitive information is quite high and so is the level of
penalties available for violation of this law, since both criminal and
civil penalties, including fines, are available. The enforcement pat-
tern of CFAA cases, even on the civil side, is consistent with this
conclusion, since most involve medical information or highly sensi-
tive business information, such as trade secrets or other proprietary
information.
B. California's Invasion of Privacy Act 174
California's concern over privacy led it to be one of the first
states to enact an array of criminal statutes whose purpose was to
protect individual privacy. The California legislature noted that
advances in science and technology had already led to the devel-
opment of new devices and techniques that permit monitoring and
recording of private communications and that the invasion of pri-
vacy resulting from the continual and increasing use of these
devices and techniques had created a serious threat to the free ex-
ercise of personal liberties.1 71 California felt such a threat could not
be tolerated in a free and civilized society.1 76 Thus, the legislature
passed the Invasion of Privacy Act in order to protect the right of
privacy of the people of California.
1 77
These restrictions are found in California Penal Code Section
631 et seq. California precludes any person from intentionally tap-
ping or making an unauthorized connection with a "telegraph or
telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument" or a person who "will-
fully and without the consent of all parties to the communication,
or in any unauthorized manner reads, or attempts to read, or to
learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or commu-
173. Garland-Sash v. Lewis, 1:05-cv-06827-VHP, 2007 WL 935013, at *2 (S.D.N.Y March
26, 2007) (citing In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 524 n.33 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); Letscher v. Swiss Bank Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8277 (LBS), 1996 WL 183019, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. April 16, 1996)).
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 630-637.9 (West 2009).
175. Id. § 630.
176. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a) (West 2008).
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 2009).
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nication while the [message] is in transit over a wire, line, or cable,
or is being sent from or received at any place [in] the state."078 Cali-
fornia has also made it a crime to eavesdrop or record a
confidential communication, which is defined as one whose cir-
cumstances "reasonably indicate that any party to the
communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto.'
79
This does not include any communication that is made at a public
gathering, in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative
proceeding that is open to the public, or any other instance in
which the parties might reasonably expect that the communication
would be overheard or recorded.
8 0
California's law is an example of a law that regulates what I de-
fine as Tier II information, though there are other portions that
deal with Tier I information. It precludes the interception or re-
cording of the content of communications without the consent of
both parties. Moreover, reflecting the lower level of protection af-
forded to stored communications, it does not require two-party
consent for the disclosure of a stored communication. California
law has been held to permit employers to monitor communica-
tions on their networks if they have a policy in place that discloses
this practice. 8' The available criminal and civil penalties under this
California law are consistent with my proposed treatment of Tier II
information. In other portions of its Penal Code, California gener-
ally permits law enforcement to wiretap if a warrant is obtained, 2
which is also consistent with the proposed characteristics of Tier II
information, since notice is not required to the target of the wire-
tap.
This law also contains restrictions similar to those that I recom-
mend for Tier I information. California has made it illegal for a
person or entity to "use an electronic tracking device to determine
the location or movement of a person."'83 Given the highly sensitive
nature of this information, violation of this portion of the law is a
crime.84 However, consistent with Tier I, the law does "not apply to
the lawful use of an electronic tracking device by a law
178. Id.
179. Id. § 632(c).
180. See id. § 633.
181. One California court permitted e-mail monitoring of employees where the em-
ployee had agreed to a monitoring policy as part of an employee handbook. TBG Ins. Serv.
Corp. v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
182. CAL. PENAL CODE § 633 (West 2009).
183. Id. § 637.7(a).
184. Id. § 637.7(e).
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enforcement agency," given the compelling need of law enforce-
ment for this sensitive type of data.
18
5
C. The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
The United States government has established an index of DNA
that contains DNA information and analysis of certain types of of-
fenders as well as selected individuals. The computer software
program that processes and uses such an index is known as the
Combined DNA Index System or CODIS . The index is main-
tained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and contains
the DNA identification records of persons convicted of crimes,
persons who have been charged in an indictment or information
with a crime, and other persons DNA samples collected under ap-
plicable legal authorities. 87 The Attorney General 8 can "collect
DNA samples8 9 from individuals who are arrested, facing charges,
or convicted or from non-United States persons who are detained
under the authority of the United States."'9 There are certain
mandatory collection requirements, including that the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons is required to "collect a DNA sample from
each individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, or
has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense.., or a qualify-
ing military offense."' 9' Additionally, the "probation office
responsible for the supervision under Federal law of an individual
on probation, parole, or supervised release" must "collect a DNA
sample from each individual who is, or has been, convicted of a
qualifying Federal offense. . . or a qualifying military offense."'92
This law governs what I describe as Tier I data, and while the go-
vernmental has certain rights to obtain this data, there are
restrictions on the collection and retention of this information.
First, there are quality checks put in to ensure accuracy since
CODIS can only include information on DNA identification re-
cords and DNA analyses that are based on analyses performed by
or on behalf of a criminal justice agency or the Secretary of De-
185. Id. § 637.7(c).
186. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a(a)(3) (West 2009).
187. Id. § 14132(a)(1)(A)-(C).
188. This authority can be delegated to the Department ofJustice, and other agencies
that arrest, detain, or supervise individuals facing charges. See id. § 14135a(a) (1) (A).
189. "The term 'DNA sample' means a tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample of an indi-
vidual on which a DNA analysis can be carried out." Id. § 14135a(c) (1).
190. Id. § 14135a(a)(1)(A).
191. Id.§ 14135a(a)(1)(B).
192. Id. § 14135a(a) (2).
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fense in accordance with 10 U.S.C.A. § 1565 (2000). The analysis
must also be done "in accordance with publicly available standards
that satisfy or exceed the guidelines for a quality assurance pro-
gram for DNA analysis, issued by the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation" under 42 U.S.C.A. § 14131, and:
prepared by laboratories that-(A) [by] October 30, 2004,
have been accredited by a nonprofit professional association
of persons actively involved in forensic science that is nation-
ally recognized within the forensic science community; and
(B) undergo external audits, not less than once every 2 years,
that demonstrate compliance with standards established by
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
193
Given the highly sensitive nature of this information (which I
would classify as Tier I information), there are specific privacy re-
quirements mandating that
the results of DNA tests performed for a Federal law en-
forcement agency for law enforcement purposes may be
disclosed only-(A) to criminal justice agencies for law en-
forcement identification purposes; (B) in judicial
proceedings, if otherwise admissible pursuant to applicable
statues or rules; and (C) for criminal defense purposes, to a
defendant, who must have access to samples and analyses per-
formed in connection with the case in which such defendant
is charged.
194
There are also expungement requirements that require the FBI
to remove "promptly" the DNA analysis of a person in two circum-
stances. 19 5 If the original placement in the index was based upon a
conviction for a qualifying federal offense or a qualifying District of
Columbia offense, the Director must expunge the record "if the
Director receives, for each conviction of the person of a qualifying
offense, a certified copy of a final court order establishing that the
conviction has been overturned." 196 If the original placement was
due to "an arrest under the authority of the United States," the Di-
rector must strike out the record "if the Attorney General receives,
for each charge against the person on the basis of which the analy-
sis was or could have been included in the index, a certified copy
193. Id.§ 14132(b)(1)-(2)(A)-(B).
194. Id.§ 14133(b)(1)(A)-(C).
195. Id. § 14132(d)(1)(A).
196. Id.§14132(d)(1)(A)(i).
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of a final97 court order establishing that such charge has been dis-
missed or has resulted in an acquittal or that no charge was filed
within the applicable time period. 198 These requirements demon-
strate the highly sensitive nature of this information and the
characterization of this law as a law covering Tier I information. In
addition, there are criminal penalties for violation of this law.19
D. Other Restrictions on Genetic Privacy
Alaska is one of many states that have placed strong restrictions
on genetic privacy. It is generally illegal for a person to:
collect a DNA00 sample from an individual, perform a DNA
analysis' °l on a sample, retain a DNA sample or the results of a
DNA analysis, or disclose the results of a DNA analysis unless
the person has first obtained the informed and written con-
sent of the person, or the person's legal guardian or
authorized representative, for the collection, analysis, reten-
tion, or disclosure.
This restriction does not apply to DNA samples collected and ana-
lyzed for certain limited statutorily defined purposes; "for a law
enforcement purpose, including the identification of perpetrators
and the investigation of crimes and the identification of missing or
unidentified persons or deceased individuals; for determining pa-
ternity; to screen newborns as required by state or federal law; [or]
for the purpose of emergency medical treatment.
2 2
197. "[A] court order is not 'final' if time remains for an appeal or application for dis-
cretionary review with respect to the order." Id. § 14132(d) (1) (C).
198. Id. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii).
199. Id. § 14135a(a)(5).
200. "'DNA' means deoxyribonucleic acid, including mitochondrial DNA, complemen-
tary DNA, and DNA derived from ribonucleic acid." ALAsKA STAT. § 18.13.100(1) (2006).
201. As defined in the statute:
"DNA analysis" means DNA or genetic typing and testing to determine the presence
or absence of genetic characteristics in an individual, including tests of nucleic acids
or chromosomes in order to diagnose or identify a genetic characteristic; "DNA
analysis" does not include a routine physical measurement, a test for drugs, alcohol,
cholesterol, or the human immunodeficiency virus, a chemical, blood, or urine
analysis, or any other diagnostic test that is widely accepted and in use in clinical
practice.
Id. § 18.13.100(2).
202. Id. § 18.13.010(a)(1).
203. Id. § 18.13.010(b)(1)-(5).
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Alaska law also provides that "a DNA sample and the results of a
DNA analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property
of the person sampled or analyzed."204 Given the concerns over this
type of data, Alaska specifically stipulates that "[a] general authori-
zation for the release of medical records or medical information
may not be construed as the informed and written consent re-
quired by this [law] .,,20, There are civil penalties for violation of this
law. Given the damage issues in privacy claims, the Alaska legisla-
ture provided for statutory damages for violations. "In addition to
the actual damages suffered by the person, a person violating this
[law is] liable to the person for damages in the amount of $5,000
or, if the violation resulted in profit or monetary gain to the viola-
tor, $100,000. ",26 The law also provides for criminal penalties.
207
This is another example of a law that covers what I define as Tier
I information. As with the law that created CODIS, the Alaska law
has strict restrictions on collection and disclosure of genetic in-
formation, even going to the point of granting the data subject an
ownership right in the DNA material and the test results. While
there are exceptions that permit disclosure, they are quite limited.
Moreover, Alaska made clear that a general medical authorization
does not grant a right to any person to run DNA tests. Consistent
with the proposed Tier I nature of the information, criminal penal-
ties exist for violations of this law. Finally, certain other states have
even gone further and limited the testing of relatives, as well as the
data subject, to find genetic predispositions.0 8
E. Notice of Security Breach Laws
Notice of security breach laws have now swept the nation, with
44 states, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico and the City of New York
all enacting laws that require notice if there is a breach of security
involving personal information of certain types.2° Many states have
204. Id. § 18.13.010(a)(2).
205. Id. § 18.13.010(c).
206. Id. § 18.13.020.
207. As noted in the statute:
A person commits the crime of unlawful DNA collection, analysis, retention, or dis-
closure if the person knowingly collects a DNA sample from a person, performs a
DNA analysis on a sample, retains a DNA sample or the results of a DNA analysis, or
discloses the results of a DNA analysis in violation of this [law).
Id. § 18.13.030(a).
208. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-8303(1)(a)-(d) (2008).
209. For a complete discussion of these laws, see SERWIN, supra note 11, at ch. 21.
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restricted notice to situations where there is unencrypted data at
issue, but this is not always the case. Moreover, consistent with the
proposed tiered approach to privacy protection, only certain
breaches of security (involving truly sensitive forms of information)
require notice to consumers.
These laws are seen as quite critical to protecting individual pri-
vacy in the United States, though they appear to be inconsistent
with the common law and tort based approaches of prior scholar-
ship for two reasons. First, while there are breaches that cause
damage to consumers, the vast majority do not. Although some
states do not require notice of breaches that are not reasonably
likely to harm consumers, the vast majority of states have not
adopted this standard. Second, these statutes impose liability for
failure to give notice, irrespective of damage to consumers. The
tort concept of damages is not the basis of the security breach laws
and the model instead is based upon enforcement related to the
sensitivity of the data and not whether there was damage.
California was the first state to require notice of data security in-
cidents by enacting Civil Code Section 1798.82, which became
effective July 1, 2003.20 As shown by the number of data security
incidents that have been disclosed, this law has had a major impact
on California companies, as well as any company that conducts
business in California, whether headquartered in California or
not.
211
Section 1798.82 applies to instances of data security breaches
that involve a consumer's personal information.2  The statute
originally defined personal information as either an individual's
first name or first initial combined with a last name and a Social
Security number, a California Driver's License number or Identifi-
cation Card number, or an account number or credit or debit card
number and the Personal Identification Number (PIN), security
code or password that would permit access to the account.2 13 How-
ever, recognizing the inherent sensitivity of other types of what I
define as Tier I information, California recently amended the
definition to include "medical information 2 14 as well as health in-
210. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2008).
211. This law impacts such companies because it attempts to regulate companies that
gather information regarding California citizens, irrespective of the corporate headquarters.
Id. § 1798.82.
212. Id. § 1798.82(b).
213. Id. § 1798.82(e).
214. Medical information is defined as "any information regarding an individual's
medical history, mental or physical condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis by a health
care professional." Id. § 1798.82(f)(2).
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surance information. Thus, breaches involving this type of infor-
mation must now also be disclosed under this law.
If the data owner reasonably believes that there has been a
breach, Section 1798.82 mandates two different disclosures. 215 The
first, and most burdensome, is applicable if a person or business
conducts business in California, owns or licenses unencrypted
computer data, and the computer data contains "personal infor-
mation" regarding a resident of California.1 6 If there is a security
breach of a computerized system that contains "personal informa-
tion" and it is known or reasonably believed that personal
information has been acquired by an unauthorized individual,
then the data owner must make a disclosure of the security breach
to the affected California residents.1 7 While certain terms are de-
fined by the statute, "acquisition" of information is not.
Notably, while not all states mandate notice unless there is a rea-
sonable likelihood of harm (though California does not follow this
model), violation of these laws typically subjects the person or
company violating the law to civil sanctions, irrespective of whether
there is damage or not.
Security breach laws pertain to information whose sensitivity
profiles would place it in my proposed Tiers I and II. The Califor-
nia data security breach law covers what I define as Tier I and II
information, because it requires notice for breaches involving So-
cial Security numbers, health information, and financial account
information if combined with other information that renders it
capable of being exploited by an identity thief, and it does not de-
pend on whether there is a likelihood of harm. In other cases
where the security breach laws have broader definitions of person-
ally identifiable information, other states have permitted
companies not to give notice unless there is a reasonable likeli-
hood of harm, which is consistent with the distinctions made
between Tiers I and II. One observation about these laws, which in
essence require the party that has suffered a breach to mitigate the
risks of the breach, is that the duty to mitigate is placed upon the
party that would be a defendant in a civil suit and not the plaintiff,
who typically would have the duty to mitigate its damages. While
there are arguably tort concepts that would require the defendant
in an action to take steps to mitigate harm, this again shows the
inconsistency between general tort concepts and privacy statutes
215. Id. § 1798.82(a)-(b).
216. Id. § 1798.82(a).
217. Id.
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we take for granted.1 8 Moreover, the form of information-
computerized information versus information contained in other
mediums that are not as likely to lead to massive identity theft-
also impacts a company's obligation to give notice, since under
most laws only a breach involving computerized data requires no-
tice. This also is consistent with Privacy 3.0's analysis.
F The Videotape Privacy Protection Acf '9
The Videotape Privacy Protection Act is a Federal law that gov-
erns the disclosure of certain consumer video records and, similar
to the pretexting laws, it resulted from a highly publicized privacy
incident.20 It is a violation of Federal law for any video tape service
provider to knowingly disclose personally identifiable informa-
tion concerning any consumer.12
A video tape service provider can disclose personally identifiable
information to the consumer or to any person with the informed,
written consent of the consumer given at the time the disclosure is
sought.2 3 Disclosure can also be made to law enforcement agencies
"pursuant to a warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, an equivalent State warrant, a grand jury subpoena, or
a court order."
224
A video tape service provider may also disclose the names and
addresses of consumers if "the video tape service provider has pro-
vided the consumer with the opportunity, in a clear and
conspicuous manner, to prohibit disclosure; and the disclosure
does not identify the tile, description, or subject matter of any
video tapes., 2 5 The subject matter of video tapes may be disclosed
218. One other notable issue with notice of security breach laws is that they were gener-
ally adopted by the United States ahead of other countries, though this may just
demonstrate that the United States information security laws generally lag behind other laws
and therefore providing notice of breaches was necessary.
219. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 2009).
220. In this incident, a reporter sought and obtained Judge Robert Bork's video rental
records during his confirmation hearings for the Supreme Court. See Dirkes v. Borough of
Runnemede, 936 F.Supp. 235, 239 (D.N.J. 1996) ("The impetus for enacting the measure
arose as a result of Judge Robert Bork's 1987 Supreme Court nomination battle, during
which a Washington, D.C. newspaper obtained a list of 146 video tapes the Bork family had
previously rented from their neighborhood store.").
221. "'Personally identifiable information' includes information which identifies a per-
son as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape
service provider." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(a) (3) (West 2009).
222. Id. § 2710(b)(1); see also SERwIN, supra note 11, atch. 23.
223. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b) (2) (A)-(B) (West 2009).
224. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(C).
225. !d. § 2710(b)(2)(D).
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only "if the disclosure is for the exclusive use of marketing goods
and services directly to the consumer."'22 There are also other per-
mitted disclosures, including with a court order.27
Injured plaintiffs are permitted to bring an action in the federal
courts and may seek actual damages, but not less than liquidated
damages in the amount of $2,500, punitive damages, reasonable
attorney's fees and costs, and any other preliminary or equitable
relief.2
28
This law is an example of a law that covers what I label as Tier II
information. There are quite broad restrictions on disclosure of
video tape rental information, including notice to the consumer
before a court orders disclosure, as well as data security require-
ments. Moreover, significant civil remedies are available, even in
the absence of actual damages, which demonstrates the sensitive
nature of the information and illustrates again one of the failings
of tort theory.
G. Federal Cable Privacy Ac1
29
In addition to the restrictions on video tape rental records, the
federal government has also placed strict privacy restrictions on
cable service providers. Cable service or other service2 0 providers
must provide notice at the time of the entry of an agreement and
at least once a year thereafter "in the form of a separate, written
statement to such subscriber which clearly and conspicuously in-
forms the subscriber" of a number of issues regarding the
collection and disclosure of personally identifiable information.22'
There are also restrictions on the collection and disclosure of in-
formation, though exceptions exist for certain legitimate business
232purposes.
Similarly to other laws that cover what I classify as Tier II infor-
mation, the Cable Privacy Act provides a range of remedies which
226. Id. § 2710(b) (2) (D) (ii).
227. Id. § 2710(b) (2) (E)-(F).
228. Id. § 2710(c)(1)-(2).
229. 47 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 2009).
230. "'[O]ther service' includes any wire or radio communications service provided us-
ing any of the facilities of a cable operator that are used in the provision of cable service." Id.
§ 551(a) (2) (B).
231. Id.§551(a)(1).
232. Id. § 551(c) (2) (A).
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include attorney's fees as well as actual, liquidated and punitive
damages. 33
This is another example of a law covering information which my
proposal would place in Tier II. This Act contains strong limita-
tions on disclosure, including the requirement that the subscriber
be given notice before the government obtains information. There
are also security and destruction requirements, as well as civil en-
forcement that includes liquidated damages. It should be noted
that there are also a number of states that have enacted similar re-
strictions.234
H. Credit Freeze Laws
Credit or security freezes permit consumers to place restrictions
upon the use and disclosure of their consumer report. 3 In many
cases, this is done after an incident that could lead to identity theft
or if identity theft is suspected. There are benefits to placing the
freeze, but such action also restricts the consumer's ability to ob-
tain credit, unless the customer temporarily lifts the freeze. In
certain states, insurers can deny insurance applications if the freeze
is not lifted. Typically, nominal fees can be charged for the place-
ment, temporary lifts, or removal of the freezes.
These laws, which operate hand-in-glove with the notice of secu-
rity breach statutes (since one of the main purposes of notice is to
alert consumers of potential risks to their credit) are not consistent
with common law concepts. In many cases (though there are ex-
ceptions) the consumer can place a freeze whether there is a risk
of identity theft or not, thus obviating the need for any type of
damage or causation elements, as tort theory requires. As with the
notice of security breach laws, there are statutory penalties, not just
damages, which are recoverable for the violation of many of these
laws. This model is inconsistent with traditional tort theory with its
requisite element of damages.
A good example of a comprehensive security freeze law is that of
the state of New York. In New York, a consumer may request that
a security freeze 23 6 be placed on his or her consumer credit
233. Any affected person may bring an action in federal court seeking "actual damages
but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of
violation or $1,000, whichever is higher, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred." Id. § 551 (f) (1)-(2).
234. For a complete discussion of these state laws, see SERWIN, supra note 11, ch. 24.
235. For a discussion of credit freeze laws, see SERWIN, supra note 11, ch. 10.
236. As noted in the statute:
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report237 and a consumer credit reporting agency that receives a
written request from a consumer, as referenced above, must, if the
statutory prerequisites are met, place a security freeze on the con-
sumer's consumer credit report no later than four business days
after receiving the written request.
If a consumer requests a security freeze, the consumer credit
reporting agency [must] disclose the process of placing and
temporarily lifting a freeze, and the process for allowing ac-
cess to information from [the] consumer credit report for a
specific party or a period of time while the freeze is in place.239
Given the perceived need to protect consumers, a consumer
credit reporting agency can only remove or temporarily lift a freeze
placed on the consumer credit report of or relating to a consumer
The term "security freeze" or "freeze" means a notice placed in the consumer credit
report of or relating to a consumer, at the request of such consumer and subject to
certain exceptions, that prohibits the consumer credit reporting agency from releas-
ing the consumer credit report, the contents of such report or the credit score of
such consumer.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 380-a(m) (McKinney 2009).
237. "The term 'consumer credit report' means a consumer report assembled, evalu-
ated or maintained by a consumer credit reporting agency, bearing on a consumer's credit
worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity." Id. § 380-a(l).
(1) The term "consumer report" means any written, oral, or other communication of
any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit wor-
thiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in
whole or part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's
eligibility for (i) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes, (ii) employment purposes, or (iii) other purposes authorized
under § 380-b of this article.
(2) The term "consumer report" does not include (i) any report containing informa-
tion solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person
making the report, (ii) any authorization or approval of a specific extension of credit
directly or indirectly by the issuer of a credit card or similar device, or (iii) any report
in which a person who has been requested by a third party to make a specific exten-
sion of credit directly or indirectly to a consumer conveys his decision with respect to
such request, if the third party advises the consumer of the name and address of the
person to whom the request was made and such person makes the disclosures to the
consumer required under § 380-i of this article.
Id. § 380-a(c) (1)-(2).
238. Id. § 380-t(b).
239. Id. § 380-t(j).
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on certain limited circumstances. While a freeze does apply to
many entities, there are many exemptions to these laws. 40
The New York credit freeze law seems to cover what I classify as
Tier II information. While financial information is certainly sensi-
tive, it does not receive the protection that other forms of
information do. Here, a consumer's information is shared unless
he or she opts-out of the sharing and places a freeze or hold on
disclosures of the information. Despite a consumer's choosing to
limit disclosures, there are still a number of circumstances where
disclosure can happen, particularly if it relates to investigating
fraud or facilitating the collection of debts. Consistent with Tier II
information, there are also procedures in this law to ensure accu-
racy of information.
I. Identity Theft
Identity theft laws relate to what I identify as Tier II informa-
tion241 because they pertain to reasonably sensitive information that
is used fraudulently. Violations of these laws can result in both
criminal and civil penalties.
Delaware law provides a good example of identity theft laws. A
person commits identity theft in Delaware "when the person know-
ingly or recklessly obtains, produces, possesses, uses, sells, gives or
transfers personal identifying information 42 belonging or pertain-
240. Certain entities are not required to place a security freeze on a consumer credit
report, including:
(2) a check services or fraud prevention services company, which issues reports on
incidents of fraud or authorizations for the purpose of approving or processing nego-
tiable instruments, electronic funds transfers, or similar methods of payments;
(3) or a deposit account information service company, which issues reports regarding
account closures due to fraud, substantial overdrafts, ATM abuse, or similar negative
information regarding a consumer, to inquiring banks or other financial institutions
for use only in reviewing a consumer request for a deposit account at the inquiring
bank or financial institution.
Id. § 380-t(p) (1)-(3).
241. SeeSERWIN, supra note 11, at ch. 19.
242. As noted in the statute:
"[P]ersonal identifying information" includes name, address, birth date, Social Secu-
rity number, driver's license number, telephone number, financial services account
number, savings account number, checking account number, credit card number,
debit card number, identification document or false identification document, elec-
tronic identification number, educational record, health care record, financial
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ing to another person without [consent] and with intent to use the
information to commit or facilitate any other crime.' 43 It is also a
crime if the "person knowingly or recklessly obtains, produces, pos-
sesses, uses, sells, gives or transfers personal identifying
information belonging or pertaining to another person [without]
consent, thereby knowingly or recklessly facilitating the use of the
information by a third person to commit or facilitate any other
crime. ,244
Identity theft in Delaware is a felony. 45 In addition to criminal
remedies, a court is also required to order "restitution for mone-
tary loss, including documented loss of wages and reasonable
attorneys fees" if the defendant is found guilty of identity theft.
246
Florida law also provides another example of an identity theft
law that falls within the Privacy 3.0 framework. It is a crime in Flor-
ida for any person to "willfully and without authorization
fraudulently use, or possess with intent to fraudulently use [an in-
dividual's] personal identification information2 47 ... without first
obtaining that individual's consent., 24  This crime is a felony
record, credit record, employment record, e-mail address, computer system pass-
word, mother's maiden name or similar personal number, record or information.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 854(c) (2007).
243. Id. § 854(a).
244. Id. § 854(b).
245. Id. § 854(d).
246. Id. § 854(e).
247. As noted in the statute:
"Personal identification information" means any name or number that may be used,
alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual,
including any:
1. Name, postal or electronic mail address, telephone number, social se-
curity number, date of birth, mother's maiden name, official state-
issued or United States-issued driver's license or identification number,
alien registration number, government passport number, employer or
taxpayer identification number, Medicaid or food stamp account num-
ber, bank account number, credit or debit card number, or personal
identification number or code assigned to the holder of a debit card by
the issuer to permit authorized electronic use of such card;
2. Unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris
image, or other unique physical representation;
3. Unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code;
4. Medical records;
5. Telecommunication identifying information or access device; or
6. Other number or information that can be used to access a person's fi-
nancial resources.
FLA. STAT. § 817.568(1)(f) (2007).
248. Id. § 817.568(2)(a).
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punishable by a prison term of not greater than five years and a
fine of not greater than $5,000 with additional penalties for habit-
ual offenders and higher levels of damages.
249
Florida's law demonstrates an inherent weakness of common law
based theories with tort enforcement-misuse of deceased individ-
ual's personally identifiable information. Typically a lawsuit based
upon tort theories requires a living plaintiff, but identity theft can
occur with deceased individuals. Florida has addressed this issue
via statute and has made it a crime if any person "willfully and
fraudulently uses, or possesses with intent to fraudulently use, per-
sonal identification information concerning a deceased individual
[thus committing] the offense of fraudulent use or possession with
intent to use personal identification information of a deceased in-
dividual.
250
j. Restrictions on Social Security Numbers
Social Security number laws also pertain to what I describe as
Tier II information. Arizona's law is discussed below. 25' Arizona has
made it illegal, as of January 1, 2005, for a person or entity to:
1. Intentionally communicate or otherwise make an
individual's social security number available to the
general public.
2. Print an individual's social security number on any
card required for the individual to receive products
or services provided by the person or entity.
3. Require the transmission of an individual's social
security number over the internet unless the con-
nection is secure or the social security number is
encrypted.
4. Require the use of an individual's social security
number to access an internet web site, unless a
password or unique personal identification number
or other authentication device is also required to
access the site.
5. Print a number that the person or entity knows to
be an individual's social security number on any
materials that are mailed to the individual, unless
249. Id. §§ 775.082-775.084, 817.568(2)(a)-(b), (6)-(7).
250. Id. § 817.568(8)(a).
251. See SERwIN, supra note 11, atch. 23 for a complete discussion of these laws.
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state or federal law requires the social security
number to be on the document to be mailed.2 5'
Arizona's law covers what I classify as Tier II information, and it
imposes broad restrictions on the disclosure of Social Security
numbers. These limitations are not absolute, particularly in the
context of preexisting use. However, consistent with the character-
istics of Tier II information, even with the preexisting use, the
consumer can elect to stop that use. Given the sensitive nature of
this information and the possibility that damages cannot be proven
as a result of the violation of this law, statutory penalties exist.
K. Pretexting
Pretexting laws, particularly those related to telephone records,
are typically laws that will cover what I describe as Tier III informa-
tion. Pretexting is an issue that caught the attention of regulators,
in-house lawyers, and outside counsel in 2006. There are a number
of laws that can regulate the practice of pretexting. A good work-
ing definition of pretexting is obtaining certain forms of
information under false pretenses, and mainly this relates to the
gathering of telephone records and financial information, though
certain states, including Illinois, have expanded the definition of
covered information. Illegal pretexting can be improper depend-
ing on the type of data, the type of person seeking it, and the
purpose of the request.
The federal government enacted the Telephone Records and
Privacy Protection Act of 2006, which governs pretexting.2-54 It is a
crime for any person in interstate or foreign commerce to
252. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1373(A)(1)-(5) (2008).
253. 72 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18G-14(a) (West. 2009).
254. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1039 (West 2009).
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knowingly and intentionally obtain, or attempt to obtain, con-
fidential phone records information2
55 of a covered entity 56
by-
(1) making false or fraudulent statements or represen-
tations to an employee of a covered entity;
(2) making [a] false or fraudulent statements or repre-
sentations to a customer of a covered entity;
(3) providing a document to a covered entity knowing
that [the] document is false or fraudulent; or
(4) accessing customer accounts of a covered entity via
the Internet, or by means of conduct that violates
[18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (the CFAA)], without prior au-
thorization from the customer to whom [the]
confidential phone record information relates. 7
It is also illegal, unless otherwise permitted by law, to "knowingly
and intentionally sell, transfer, or attempt to sell or transfer, confi-
dential phone record information of a covered entity, without
255. As noted in the statute:
The term "confidential phone records information" means information that-
(A) relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, loca-
tion, or amount of use of a service offered by a covered entity,
subscribed to by any customer of that covered entity, and kept by or on
behalf of that covered entity solely by virtue of the relationship between
that covered entity and the customer;
(B) is made available to a covered entity by a customer solely by virtue of
the relationship between that covered entity and the customer; or
(C) is contained in any bill, itemization, or account statement provided to a
customer by or on behalf of a covered entity solely by virtue of the rela-
tionship between that covered entity and the customer.
Id. § 1039(h)(1).
256. As noted in the statute:
"The term 'covered entity'-(A) has the same meaning given the term "telecommu-
nications carrier" in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 153);
and (B) includes any provider of IP-enabled voice service." Id. § 1038(h) (2).
The term "IP-enabled voice service" means the provision of real-time voice communi-
cations offered to the public, or such class of users as to be effectively available to the
public, transmitted through customer premises equipment using TCP/IP protocol,
or a successor protocol, (whether part of a bundle of services or separately) with in-
terconnection capability such that the service can originate traffic to, or terminate
traffic from, the public switched telephone network, or a successor network.
Id. § 1039(h) (4).
257. Id. § 1039(a).
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prior authorization from the customer to whom the confidential
phone record information relates, or knowing or having reason to
know [the] information was fraudulently obtained."25 8 This is also a
crime punishable by a fine, a prison term of not more than ten
years, or both.2 59 There are other additional restrictions in this law,
as well as enhanced penalties and certain other limited exceptions.
This is a good example of a law that regulates what I label as
Tier III information. While there are criminal penalties involved, a
violation of this law only occurs if the records were gathered in a
fraudulent way, or if other crimes are involved. Also, the law is
somewhat limited because it only applies to the request, or receipt,
of records from particular entities. Thus, while pretexting in many
cases can be improper, the way the law treats the information (par-
ticularly in light of Supreme Court precedent) is consistent with
Tier III.
L. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing
Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAMfo
CAN-SPAM presents a clear example of a law that would fall
within the proposed Tier IV law.261 Congress passed the CAN-SPAM
Act in reaction to certain state e-mail laws, California's in particu-
lar.262  These state laws went far beyond what the federal
government was willing to do, so CAN-SPAM was passed with the
goal of preempting (and in essence nullifying) the troublesome
portions of state law.2 63 CAN-SPAM was not a bill that was initially
well received, though the criticism seems to have died down in re-
cent times. The main criticism of CAN-SPAM is that it did not
explicitly prohibit unsolicited e-mails. 26 4 Despite this perceived
shortcoming, CAN-SPAM has increased the FTC's ability to stop
spam.65 States at this point seem to be taking a back seat to the
258. Id.§ 1039(b)(1).
259. Id.
260. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003,
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7701-7713 (West 2009).
261. See SERWIN, supra note 11, at chs. 7-8 for a discussion of CAN-SPAM and state
email laws.
262. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.1 (West 2008).
263. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7701 (a)(11) (West 2003).
264. 15 U.S.CA, § 7704(a) (5) (b) (West 2003).
265. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7706(a) (West 2003).
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FTC on these issues, though state law-based lawsuits relating to un-
solicited e-mail still occur.66
Given the judgment by Congress that a person's email address
did not justify the level of protection afforded by state law, CAN-
SPAM in essence placed three main requirements on most entities
that send advertisements through e-mail. First, they must have a
"clear and conspicuous identification that the message is an adver-
tisement or solicitation."267 Second, there must be "clear and
conspicuous notice of the opportunity" to opt-out of future com-
mercial e-mails, as well as the inclusion of a return address or other
mechanism that allows opt-out requests. 68 Third, each commercial
e-mail must contain a valid physical postal address for the sender.269
If affirmative consent from the recipient is obtained, then the clear
and conspicuous statement that the email is an advertisement or
solicitation is not needed.70
There are, of course, other restrictions on e-mails under
CAN-SPAM, including the adult-oriented content rules, as well as
criminal restrictions upon improper means of gathering e-mail ad-
dresses or misleading consumers, but there is no consumer redress
for unsolicited e-mail under CAN-SPAM.
This law deals with proposed Tier IV information. Consumers
can object to receiving e-mails, but it is not illegal for a person to
send unsolicited emails. Also, the consumer at issue has no direct
civil remedy for violation of this law. While there are criminal
remedies in limited situations, these are only applicable if there is,
in essence, independently improper conduct related to the use or
gathering of addresses or the registration of email addresses.
Moreover, other remedies do exist, but they typically involve other
deceptive conduct.
XIII. LEGISLATURES Do NOT ALWAYS ASSESS THE RISKS CORRECTLY
The laws identified above that demonstrate the validity of Pri-
vacy 3.0 should not be read to mean that legislators always make
the correct assessment. Indeed, one of the overarching needs of a
266. See, e.g., Omni Innovations, LLC v. Impulse Mktg. Group, Inc., No. C06-1469MJP,
2007 WL 2110337 (W.D. Wash. July 18, 2007); Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., No. 06-0204-JCC,
2007 WL 1459395 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2007); Phillips v. Netblue, Inc., No. C-05-4401 SC,
2006 WL 3647116 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2006); ASIS Internet Services v. Optin Global, Inc., 65
Fed. R. Serv. 3d 404 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
267. 15 U.S.CA § 7704(a) (5) (A) (i) (West 2003).
268. Id. § 7704(a)(3)(A)-(B), (a)(5)(A).
269. Id. § 7704(a)(5)(a)(iii).
270. Id. §(a)(5)(B).
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viable theoretical construct is to provide guidance and a framework
to make the laws more consistent. While there are certainly more
than a few examples of laws that are inconsistent with the principle
of proportionality, in many such cases courts and others have
struggled with the application of these laws. One area where Con-
gress did not more closely follow the factors discussed in this
Article is when the CFAA was amended several years ago. In order
to prove one type of claim under the CFAA the plaintiff must show
"loss. " 1 7 Previously, there was no requirement that an electronic
system be damaged, but the recent amendment added a new re-
quirement-that there be some type of system interruption to
show loss. This amendment does not truly capture the purpose of
the law and it adds a factor into the claim that does not truly mat-
ter in assessing whether conduct is wrongful. Indeed, if the
information taken is highly sensitive, such as trade secrets, whether
there was an impairment of the system or not would seem to be
irrelevant to the harm inflicted by the conduct. Similarly, whether
there is an interruption in service would be irrelevant under the
Privacy 3.0 framework.
Courts have now struggled with this element of the CFAA.
Courts in the Ninth Circuit continue to liberally permit claims un-
der the CFAA where there is no clear allegation of system
12interruption and, therefore, no loss, as have other courts. How-
ever, many other courts have struggled with this requirement and
reached inconsistent results. In Spangler, the District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana also recently assessed the damage
element for a Section 1030(a) (5) claim in the context of alleged
misconduct by an attorney as she departed her former employer.
In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a partner at
plaintiffs law firm, took proprietary information, including client
lists and e-data files, before her departure from the firm and as
271. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a) (5) (C) (West 2008).
272. See Therapeutic Research Faculty v. NBTY, 488 F. Supp. 2d 991 (E.D. Cal. 2007)
(citing Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1126 (W.D. Wash. 2000)) (holding that a claim could be stated under the CFAA against a
party that exceeded authorized use of a password and thereby obtained additional access to
licensed materials); see also PharMerica, Inc. v. Arledge, No. 8:07-cv-00486-T-26MAP, 2007 WL
865510, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2007) (holding that employer had demonstrated likeli-
hood of success on CFAA claim where an employee that downloaded confidential
information to use with a competitor and deleted files and records related to the download-
ing); H & R Block E. Enters., Inc. v.J&M Sec., LLC, No. 05-1056-W-DW, 2006 WL 1128744, at
*4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 24, 2006); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435,
439 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Pacific Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (E.D.
Wash. 2003).
273. Spangler, Jennings & Dougherty, P.C. v. Mysliwy, 2:05-cv-108, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39602, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006).
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part of her plan to set up a competing law firm. The plaintiff
moved for summary judgment on its CFAA claim which the court
ultimately denied, noting that while the plaintiff argued that it in-
curred costs to investigate the alleged improper access, it did not
show that there was any impairment of data or the system that
would support a finding of qualified losses under Section
1030(a) (5) .274 Again other courts have followed this line of reason-
ing as well.275
The interruption in service requirement continues to befuddle
courts. For example, in PC. of Yonkers,"6 former employees alleg-
edly took trade secret and confidential information regarding the
plaintiff's business and used it to open up competing businesses.
The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the CFAA claim, as-
serting that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the CFAA, as
they had not demonstrated any "loss" under Section
1030(a) (5) (B) (1).277 The PC. Yonkers court examined Nexans Wires
S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc. 278 and Resdev279 and concluded that these cases
made a distinction between costs incurred as a result of an incident
and lost revenue or other consequential damages. 2"° The court
noted that loss under the CFAA is "any reasonable cost to any vic-
tim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a
damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or
information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred be-
cause of interruption of service., 28' The court concluded that the
274. Id. at 13; see also Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, No. 6:04-cv-1374-Orl-31DAB,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19099, at *12 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (explaining that the CFAA requires
some finding of "diminution in the completeness or usability of data or information on a
computer system"); Moulton v. VC3, No. 1:00-CV-434-TWT, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19916, at
*20 (ND. Ga. 2000) (disallowing investigative costs as damage under the CFAA where al-
leged incident did not result in "structural" damage to the network).
275. Cenveo Corp. v. CelumSolutions Software GMBH & Co KG, 504 E Supp. 2d 574
(D. Minn. 2007) (dismissing CFAA claim based upon improper access to an employer's con-
fidential information because the complaint did not allege an interruption of service, and
therefore failed to allege loss); see also Spangler, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39602, at *20 (stating
that allegations of downloading of firm information by attorney who was leaving her em-
ployer failed to demonstrate a CFAA because there was no allegation of system impairment,
and therefore no loss).
276. No. 04-4554 (JAG), 2007 WL 708978, at *1 (D. N.J. Mar. 5, 2007).
277. Id. at *4.
278. 166 Fed. Appx. 559 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2006).
279. Resdev, LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19099, at *12.
280. PC. of Yonkers, Inc., 2007 WL 708978, at *4 ("As the Second Circuit found, the plain
language of the [CFAA] treats lost revenue as a different concept from incurred costs, and
permits recovery of the former only where connected to an interruption in service." (inter-
nal citations and quotations marks omitted)).
281. 18 U.S.CA § 1030(e) (11) (West 2008).
928 [VOL. 42:4
SUMMER 2009]
"interruption of service" requirement applied only to the portion
of the definition that addresses "any revenue lost, cost incurred, or
other consequential damages," but not to any allegation that re-
lated to "the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a
damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or
information to its condition prior to the offense ..., Thus, the
court read the definition of loss to have two different components,
the first of which does not require an interruption of service if the
loss relates to the costs of responding to an offense, conducting a
damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or
information to its condition prior to the offense, and a second that
includes lost revenue, incurred costs, or other consequential dam-
ages that result from an interruption of service.8 3 Under this
definition, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a
claim under the CFAA.1s4 It is notable that the plaintiffs in this mat-
ter never alleged either damage or interruption of service, but
rather argued that they had suffered "substantial losses in excess of
$5,000.00, including but not limited to losses sustained in respond-
ing to defendants' actions, investigating defendants' actions and
taking remedial steps to prevent defendants' further actions."8 5
Nowhere did plaintiff articulate how it suffered damage to a com-
puter or an interruption of service.
A different conclusion was reached in L-3 Communications West-
286
wood Corp. v. Robicharux. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that its
former employees took proprietary and trade secret information
from their former employer, L-3, in the form of emails and an ex-
ternal drive containing an extensive number of confidential files.28 7
The plaintiff argued that the defendants used this information to
compete with L-3 in an effort to obtain government contracts.2s
Although this court relied upon the same cases as the PC. Yonkers
court, it reached a different conclusion.8 9 In fact, this court cre-
ated a two-pronged definition of loss, one portion of which
282. PC. of Yonkers, Inc., 2007 WL 708978, at *4-5.
283. Id.
284. Id. at *5.
285. Id.
286. No. 2:06-cv-00279-MLV-SS, 2007 WL 756528, *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2007)
287. Id. at *2-3.
288. Id. at *2.
289. This court concluded, based on Nexans, that a plaintiff must allege either damage
to a computer or an interruption of service to show loss under Section 1030(g). Id. at *4
(citing Civil Ctr. Motors, Ltd. v. Mason St. Imp. Cars, Ltd., 387 F. Supp. 2d 378, 381-82
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Nexans Wires SA. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319 E Supp. 2d. 468, 478 (S.D.N.Y.
2004)) ("[Closts not related to computer impairment or computer damages are not com-
pensable under the CFAA.").
Privacy 3. 0
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
requires damage to a computer, and one that requires an interrup-
tion of service. The court concluded that a CFAA claim could not
be stated because the only allegation was theft of trade secrets and
confidential information and the resulting harm was misuse of the
information to compete, without a showing of damage to a com-
puter or an interruption of service.29°
The confusion created by the insertion of the interruption in
service requirement demonstrates the need for a cohesive theory
of privacy based on factors related to the sensitivity of the data, not
impairment of a network. If the concern with the CFAA that led to
the amendment inserting the interruption in service element was a
worry that too many CFAA claims would be brought if the thresh-
old was only $5,000, then the dollar value of the information could
be increased, or, following the tiered approach suggested in this
Article, it could be restricted to Tier I and II information over a
certain value.
CONCLUSION
The failure of today's privacy laws to meet societal needs can no
longer be the subject of serious debate. The only question is
whether the common law should serve as the basis for privacy the-
ory in the United States. The inherent issues with common law
theories resulting from today's information sharing-based culture,
the failure of tort theories to provide consistent enforcement, and
the FTC enforcement centric model demonstrate that the next
theoretical construct of privacy should be the principle of propor-
tionality, not the common law. Over time, the categories of
information that fall within the resulting tiers will change, but the
structure, and the general restrictions tied to each tier, will not.
This will provide the stability necessary to bring order to the con-
fusing morass of the privacy laws of today and help guide the
privacy laws of tomorrow.
Facebook and Flickr await.
290. Id.
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